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DEPARTMENT OF ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BATTALION 8TH INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96355

AVDDA-BRAD-3

7 June 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: J3-32)

TO: Commanding General
4th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDDH-GC

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation HANCOCK I - Search and Destroy.
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 260001 April 1967 to 222105 May 1967
3. (U) LOCATION: HANCOCK I area of operation in DARLAC Province was defined as follows:
 - a. North Boundary: North-South grid line AQ/BQ70.
 - b. South Boundary: North-South grid line AQ20 between East-West grid line AQ75 and East-West grid line AQ90, and by highway QL21 between East-West grid line AQ90 and East-West grid line BQ50.
 - c. East Boundary: East-West grid line BQ50.
 - d. West Boundary: East-West grid line AQ75 between North-South grid lines AQ70 and AQ20; East-West grid line AQ90 between North-South grid line AQ20 and highway QL21.
4. (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry
5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: LTC Thomas P Lynch, Commanding Officer 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, Principal subordinate commanders and staff officers who participated in HANCOCK I are shown in Inclosure 1.
6. (U) TASK ORGANIZATION
 - a. 260001H April 1967 - 130430H May 1967
3d Bn, 8th Inf
1/A/1-10 Cav
A/5-16 Arty
C/6-29 Arty

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BY	LTC LYNCH
DATE	19 JUL 71

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2/D/4-60 Arty

1/A-4 Engr

2d Plat, 170th Avn Co, 52d Avn Bn

a-238th Det, 5th SF Gp with 2 CING Companies (OPCON)

b. 190431H May 1967 - 222105H May 1967

3d Bn, 8th Inf

1/A/1-10 Cav

A/5-16 Arty

C/6-29 Arty

2/B/4-60 Arty (Duster)

1/A-4 Engr

A-238th Det, 5th SF Gp with 2 CING Companies (OPCON)

A-233d Det, 5th SF Gp with 2 CING Companies (OPCON)

2 Companies Regional Forces (Bun Ho District) (OPCON)

2 Companies Regional Forces (Quang Nhai District) (OPCON)

2d Plat, 170th Assault Helicopter Company, 52d Avn Bn

7. (U) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Non-organic and non-attached supporting forces.

(1) 7th Air Force

(2) 2/45 ARVN Bn, 23d ARVN Div

(3) 179th Assault Spt Co, 52nd Avn Bn

(4) 180th Assault Spt Co, 105th Avn Bn

b. Artillery Support

(1) Direct fire support to maneuver elements was provided by the attachment of C Battery, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105T) and A Battery, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155SP). In addition an attached detachment from B Battery, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (Duster) provided security for the trains area and limited

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convoy security. On one occasion the 23rd ARVN Division supported the airmobile movement into the FSB located at BQ127328 with two 105mm Howitzers pre-positioned at Buon Ho (BQ033288).

(2) The 105mm and 155mm artillery batteries supported not only the organic and OPCON elements of the task force but also supported operations of the 2/45 ARVN Battalion when operating in coordination and cooperation with the task force.

(3) All artillery fire support was coordinated by the battalion's ALO and with the exception of one instance of support by two 105mm howitzers of the 23d ARVN Division, no other artillery fire support was available or necessary.

(4) Artillery ammunition expenditure for HANCOCK I follows:

<u>CALIBER</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
105mm	2606
155mm	3096

c. Air Support.

(1) Throughout the operation the task force was supported by one AF O-1E aircraft and two AF forward air controllers. These forward air controllers flew a total of twelve column cover and 58 airstrike missions.

(2) Of the 102 preplanned tactical airstrikes requested, 69 were executed in support of task force operations. Of these 69 missions; eleven were combat proofs and 58 were FAC controlled. In addition, two immediate airstrikes were flown in support of ground contacts.

(3) Results of airstrikes were 75 bunkers destroyed (estimated), eight military structures destroyed and one incident of a secondary explosion. Although approximately 65% of the airstrikes were checked by ground elements within 24 to 72 hours following the strike, no valid estimate of KBA can be made.

(4) The most effective type of ordnance used by the AF in support of ground tactical operations appeared to be the CBU and 750 pound bombs, based on assessment of damage made by elements on the ground.

d. Armor Support: The attached armored cavalry platoon proved to be extremely valuable in a variety of security, screening and reconnaissance missions. The cavalry platoon provided the necessary security for land convoys whenever the fire support base and trains were displaced. Whenever resupply convoys moved within the AO, the cavalry platoon provided necessary security. It also provided security for the S3's village visitation program. It was proven that the cavalry platoon could operate effectively in screening missions although the terrain offered some degree of difficulty to cross country movement; nonetheless the

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platoon could and did effectively operate on established road nets. During route reconnaissance and screening operations the cavalry platoon found numerous trail systems and cross country routes of advance.

e. Army Aviation Support:

(1) The aviation support provided by the 2d platoon 170th Assault Helicopter Company, 52nd Aviation Battalion consisted of one UH1D aircraft used as command and control, six UH1F aircraft used for resupply and troop lifts and two UH-1B gunships used for a variety of fire support missions.

(2) The attached aviation support proved to be responsive and adequate for accomplishment of resupply and the majority of the troop lifts. Whenever additional army aviation support was required, as in the displacement of the entire task force with OPCON units, requests for additional support were responsive and adequate to meet requirements.

(3) CH-47 aircraft for resupply and displacement of fire bases were provided from the resources of the 152nd and 155th Aviation Groups on a mission type basis. In most cases this support was adequate although occasionally the desired responsiveness was not attained because of heavy commitments of the aircraft.

(4) Total sorties and hours flown by the 2nd Platoon, 170th Assault Helicopter Company, 52nd Aviation Battalion, in support of the HANCOCK I Operation were 2783 and 923 respectively. CH-47 sorties and hours flown were 208 and 520 respectively.

f. Engineer Support: The attached engineer squad provided the task force with the necessary technical assistance, to evaluate stream crossing sites and construct fortified positions.

g. Psyops Support:

(1) Psychological operations were conducted in conjunction with tactical operations and the civil affairs program emphasizing the GVN Chieu Hoi Program, "GVN builds/VC destroys themes", and special warnings to the local populace of US forces operating in the area.

(2) Psychological operations consisted of tape appeals and leaflet drops conducted by U-10 and C-47 aircraft from the 245th Psyops Company. A total of 315,000 leaflets were dropped during two (2) separate drops and a total speaker time of 3½ hours was used. Additionally several ground appeals were made and leaflets were distributed by the Battalion S-5 during the conduct of the civil affairs program in support of tactical operations.

h. Civil Affairs/Civic Action Support:

(1) Due to its temporary mission, the battalion relied primarily on its organic resources in the conduct of the civil affairs program. During several cordon and search operations by tactical units, sick calls were held and commodities were distributed in villages.

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throughout the area of operations.

(2) The TF was assisted by National Police teams when conducting its civil affair program. The National Police proved of value in not only providing instant interpreting, but also in effective screening of villagers. It should be noted that two Red Check with weapons surrendered themselves to the battalion MEDCAP team while it was conducting a sickcall. Additionally 10 confirmed VC were picked up during MEDCAP operations.

(3) Although only short-term, high-impact projects such as MEDCAP could be used due to the limited period of operation, the local populace was friendly and cooperative with US efforts and an effective long range civil affairs program could have been initiated if time had permitted.

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE

a. Estimate of enemy strength, composition and disposition prior to HANCOCK I.

(1) Within the AO:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
3d Bn, 33rd NVA Reg	Prob	Unknown	BQ1542	15 April 1967
H.5 LF Co	C	100	Vic MEAM Plant	
H.4 LF Co	C	100	BQ1934	

(2) Outside but adjacent to AO:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
D-1 LF Bn	C	400	BP1484	21 Dec 66
D-2 MF Bn (NM)	C	400	BFO490	22 Feb 67
H-6 LF Co	C	100	AP7692	
H-8 LF Co	C	100	AP8690	
H-9 LF Co	C	100	BP3094	
H-10 LF Co	C	100	BPO456	28 Jan 67

In addition to the above indicated units, it is estimated that DARLAC Province has as many as 10 separate guerrilla units with an estimated total strength of 108 personnel. These forces are subordinate to VCQG (DARLAC) Province Hq and the appropriate VC district headquarters in the area in which they operate.

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(3) Total estimate of enemy strength in DARTAC Province
Prior to operation HANCOCK I:

Combat Units	1400
Guerrilla Units	108
Hitler Units	3200
Political Cadre	<u>840</u>
	5548

b. Enemy Activity Prior to HANCOCK I: Prior to the beginning of Operation HANCOCK I enemy activity increased throughout DARTAC Province. However specific points of interest, i.e. Ban Me Thuot, District Headquarters, and GVN controlled communities, were indicated as possible targets for attacks by battalion size VC forces. Acts of terrorism, to include abduction of village chiefs and young people, were widespread and frequent.

Propaganda lectures by local force VC cadre were numerous with many villages reporting the cadre returning to the same villages repeatedly. Throughout February, March and April contact between NVA/VC forces and ARVN/CIDG forces became numerous and frequent. It was anticipated that at least one NVA Battalion (3d Bn, 33rd Regt) and one VC Company (H-4 LF Co) would attempt to attack in force in Buon Ho District.

c. Enemy capabilities, analysis of capabilities, vulnerabilities and probable courses of action for the HANCOCK I operation as developed prior to and during the operation follows:

(1) Capabilities

(a) The enemy can continue to conduct aggressive small unit (squad and platoon size) ambush, propaganda, foraging and recruitment operations in areas outside of direct GVN control.

(b) The enemy is capable of launching company and battalion size assaults on friendly troop locations at any time, using units currently available within the province.

(c) The enemy is capable of consolidating existing battalions, or reinforcing provincial units with personnel from outside the province, in order to launch multi-battalion or regimental assaults on major population centers and/or friendly unit locations to include Ban Me Thuot.

(d) The enemy can break down existing company and battalion sized units into squads and platoons for the purpose of conducting small-scale ambush and harassment operations. Propaganda activity will foraging.

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e. (c) The enemy is capable of occupying up to regimental size defensive positions in the western and eastern portions of the AO, if forced to do so.

f. (c) The enemy can, at any time, withdraw to relatively "safe" areas (i.e., Cambodia or the heavily vegetated and mountainous eastern and southern region of the province) for the training, rest and reorganization of battalions and smaller size units.

g. (c) The enemy is capable of infiltrating agents or action teams to GVN controlled areas for the purpose of conducting espionage, sabotage and subversion.

h. (c) The enemy can continue to use the southern and eastern portion of the province for the year around infiltration of battalion size units into DARLAC and other neighboring provinces.

(2) Analysis of Capabilities:

(a) The enemy has achieved a certain degree of success in his conduct of small unit (squad and platoon) operations within the AO. The use of small units affords him maximum freedom of movement, reduces his vulnerability to friendly air reconnaissance, and increases his chances for successful foraging.

(b) Enemy commitment of company and battalion size units to seize and hold operations would not be advantageous due to the present retaliatory capabilities of friendly forces. However, company and battalion size raid and ambush operations would inflict maximum casualties upon friendly elements and allow economy of forces. It is likely that this type of activity would be more prevalent during the rainy season when tactical concealment for deception is more readily available.

(c) If the ultimate goal of the enemy within the AO is to gain control of principle population centers and LOC's, the initiation of multi-battalion or regimental size operations becomes mandatory. To date, there have been only slight indications of such a desire on the part of the enemy. Large scale operations of this nature would present lucrative target for massed air and ground forces. Limited opportunities for deception and logistical problems would place severe handicaps upon the units involved. Without the willing support and cooperation of a major portion of the civilian population, such a course of action is unlikely. Should this course of action be adopted, it would probably involve operations during the southwest monsoon period.

(d) The enemy has developed a pattern of breaking down into platoon and squad size units when attempting to avoid or break contact with friendly elements, or when involved in foraging, tax collection and propaganda activity. Topographical, political and sociological aspects of the area of operations favor this course of action.

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(e) The mountainous, heavily vegetated eastern and western portions of the AO provide the enemy with his most favorable opportunities for defensive operations. To date however, the enemy has avoided being caught in static defensive positions and it is likely that this pattern will continue.

(f) The enemy in the AO has developed a pattern of withdrawing when pressured by the tactical operations of friendly units. Withdrawal to the west in Cambodia would tend to be limited to the period of the southeast monsoons. Withdrawal to the mountainous southern and eastern regions of the province for rest, reorganization and resupply is more likely.

(g) Opportunities for the infiltration of espionage agents, saboteurs and political action cadre into population centers were numerous. It is assumed that enemy agents or informants exist at all friendly unit base locations. There have been no recognized acts of sabotage directed against GVN, friendly force installations, or facilities during the operational period. However, it is presumed that if a sufficiently lucrative target presents itself, the enemy would initiate sabotage activities. It is also presumed that the enemy would take advantage of political or sociological unrest in order to further its subversive goals.

(h) The tactical cover and concealment available in the western and eastern portions of the AO make these areas ideal locations for year around infiltration routes, both into DARIAC Province itself or into its border provinces. Local rice production provides ample opportunities for resupply and the rugged terrain limits the effectiveness of friendly ground operations.

(3) Vulnerabilities:

(a) Threat of exposure to air reconnaissance restricts enemy movement to night, periods of limited visibility, and areas of heavy vegetation.

(b) Large unit concentrations are subject to air reconnaissance and air strikes.

(c) Operational units must rely upon the local economy for frequent resupply.

(d) Poor squad and platoon level communication.

(4) Probable courses of action:

(a) Aggressive small unit (squad and platoon) ambush, harassment, propaganda, forage and recruitment operations.

(b) Company and battalion size raids and ambushes on populated centers, friendly troop concentrations and LOC's with principle targets being those areas involved in the RD program.

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(c) Infiltration of units into DARLAC and through DARLAC to neighboring provinces.

(5) Due to the departure of the task force from the area, enemy capabilities must be considered not to have been appreciably altered as a result of Operation HANCOCK I. During the presence of US Forces, however, the enemy's freedom of movement and action was restricted severely and he was forced to operate on small unit level. He was unable to mass any sizeable force to conduct operations. The use of National Police teams with VC blacklists in several outlying VC villages damaged the VC infrastructure in several areas at least temporarily.

d. ~~Enemy~~ units identified:

(1) "6B Battalion (VC) located Vic Ban Yum coordinates YA873390 on 13 May 1967. No other details available. Information received from interrogation of detainees picked up south of Ban Yum.

(2) Q126 Company located Vic Buon Tong Lea coordinates YA866325 on 13 May 1967. No other details available. Information received from interrogation of detainees picked up in Buon Tong Lea.

e. ~~d.~~ Significant enemy activity (see Inclosures 2,3&4).

9. (C) MISSION: To conduct search and destroy operations within the prescribed HANCOCK I area of operations, operating in cooperation and coordination with ARVN forces; provide necessary convoy security for resupply convoys moving within the HANCOCK I area of operation.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: TF 3/8 Inf employed three US Rifle companies, an ARVN battalion (through cooperation and coordination), from two to four CIDG companies and from one to four RF companies in mutually supporting roles to search and destroy within the HANCOCK I area of operation. The actual combat operation was in four phases involving search and destroy in four separate but related geographical locations. The attached cavalry platoon provided route reconnaissance, security for convoy movement and conducted missions associated with the maneuver of US rifle companies. 105mm and 155mm artillery fires organic to TF 3/8 Inf supported the maneuver of ARVN, CIDG and RF as well as U.S. Forces.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. General

(1) Operation HANCOCK I was initiated by TF 3/8 Inf at 241000 April 1967 as directed by Division FRAGO 9-2-67 implementing OPLAN 7-67. Major elements were disposed prior to the operation as follows: 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry (-) at Jackson Hole (YA89315) with Co A 3/8 becoming OPCON to 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry on 24 April and being released.

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to 3d Battalion 8th Infantry on 25 April 1967; C Battery, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105 towed) located at Jackson Hole (YA89315); A Battery, 5th Battalion 16th Artillery located at Plei Me (ZA157061); Detachment A-238 (2 Companies OPCON) Ban Blech (BQ007597) Darlac Province.

(2) Operation HANCOCK I is viewed as occurring in our time phases.

(a) Phase One - 21000 April to 292400 April 1967: Elements of the Task Forces departed Jackson Hole to Dragon Mountain for consolidation of the task force and preparation for moving to first fire support base to located at coordinates AQ985433. Phase I includes the search and destroy portion of operation, East from the initial FSB to determine the existence of the 3rd of the 33rd NVA Battalion. (See Inclosure 6)

(b) Phase II - 300001 April 1967 until 130430 May 1967: Included moving the FSB to vic coordinates BQ127328. This phase consisted mainly of search and destroy operations, still looking for the NVA battalion after confirming they had been in the last area sweep of Phase I, but had moved East and Southeast. This phase was highlighted by the close working arrangement between 2nd Battalion, 45th Regiment (ARVN, A238th SF Detachment Companies and US Forces. (See Inclosure 7)

(c) Phase III - 130431 May 1967 to 172400 May 1967: (MEVAL) This phase was conducted against VC (main and local forces) in the vicinity of the MEVAL Plantation. This phase as well as Phase II had great psychological value because both were conducted in areas where ARVN, CIDG or US Forces had never previously operated in strength. This phase continued as a search and destroy operation, however companies operated in smaller elements (platoon size) when searching areas. (See Inclosure 8)

(d) Phase IV - 180001 May to 222105 May 1967: Consisted of displacement of FSB and continuation of search and destroy north of the MEVAL Plantation until 20 May, followed by deployment to Jackson Hole and return to OPCON 1st Bde. (See Inclosure 9)

b. There was one significant contact during HANCOCK I which occurred during Phase II. At 021315 May 1967 at BQ145415, Company B made contact with 30 to 40 NVA. NVA were engaged with small arms, artillery and 2 immediate airstrikes. Company C, working to the north of Company B, was receiving sniper fire from the trees. Results of the contact were 2 NVA KIA, 1 VC WIA (POW); 1 AK-47, 45 Chicom grenades and 5 backpacks captured. After the contact, blood trails were found leading north and east from the area of contact. Both B and C Companies swept the area.

c. Significant events were indicated in chronological order and attached at Inclosure 5.

d. Overlays of unit movements are attached at Inclosures 6-9. For phases I - IV respectively.

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12. (C) RESULTS:

a. Summary of enemy personnel and equipment losses.

(1) Personnel

(a) KIA (BC) 27

1 NVA 5

2 VC 22

(b) Detainees 73

1 POW's 9

2 Civil Defendants 0

3 Innocent Civilians 64

4 Returnees 0

5 Hoi Chanh 2

(2) Weapons

US Carbine, M1 10

AK-47 4

SKS 5

Mauser 1

US Springfield, M1903 4

(3) Ammunition

60mm Mortar 1

Rocket (unknown identity) 7

82mm Mortar 2

57mm Recoiless 3

M-79 Grenades 22

Small Arms Ammo 4931

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(4) Explosives

TNT ($\frac{1}{4}$ pound blocks)	15
Grenade, hand	62
Blasting caps, electric	50
AT mine, M1A1	1

(5) Structures and Fortifications Destroyed:

Structures	60
Fortifications	80

(6) Foodstuffs: 11 tons rice captured

(7) Equipment captured and/or destroyed

Entrenching tools	15
Pistol Belts	3
Bayonets	2
Rucksacks	1
Canteen cup carrier	1
Fatigues	12 sets
Blankets	2
Khaki shirts	7
Fatigue shirts	7
Khaki trousers	2

(8) It is believed that enemy KIA figures were considerably higher than those indicated because of the enemy's ability to rapidly police casualties resulting from H&I fires, airstrike and ground contact. Furthermore, many airstrikes and H&I locations were not swept by friendly forces.

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b. Summary of friendly losses:

(1) Personnel (all battle):

KIA	2
WIA	9

(2) Equipment:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Lost or Destroyed</u>
Flashlight	3
Compass, Lensatic	2
Compass M2	2
Knives	6
Colt AR-15	3
Binocular, 7x30	1

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS :

a. General

(1) The concept of logistic support for Operation HANCOCK I was to provide required support as far forward as possible. To accomplish this, a FSE of the 4th S&T Bn was positioned with the battalion's trains. All requests for class I, II, III, IV and V supplies were forwarded to the FSE which, in turn, requisitioned the items from stockpiled material at Camp Enari. All elements of the task force forwarded requests through the S-4, 3d Bn, 8th Inf who, in turn, forwarded requests to the FSE.

(2) Initially, the battalion trains was established at Ban Blech (BQ007497) and later displaced to Ban Me Thout East (AQ873018) on 13 May 1967.

(3) The initial stockage of supplies was by truck convoy. Thereafter, resupply of the FSE was by truck convoy and aerial delivery (CH-47 and CV-7A aircraft), with emphasis on aerial resupply in order to minimize the necessity for land convoys with their inherent security problems. Resupply of companies deployed in the field was by aerial delivery (UH1D and CH-47 aircraft). Resupply of POL to the Armored Cavalry Platoon was accomplished primarily by aerial delivery to the unit's field location.

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(4) The S-4 section of the 3d Bn 8th Inf was responsible for the physical handling of all incoming supplies. Therefore, a significant problem existed, resulting from the lack of qualified personnel for handling these supplies. This was particularly true for sensitive bulky items such as artillery ammunition. Future independent task force operations of HANCOCK I type should include an augmentation of an appropriate share of artillery ammunition section personnel to provide the experience and manpower necessary for handling ammunition.

(5) Normally an infantry battalion has little need for slings to accomplish external lifts of aerial resupply loads. The HANCOCK I operation required the use of many. Since the artillery and cavalry units were not provided these items, a constant shortage existed. In future operation of the HANCOCK I type, adequate supply of slings and associated equipment should be accumulated prior to deployment.

(6) 2nd echelon maintenance of wheeled and tracked vehicles was hampered by insufficient numbers of qualified maintenance personnel. The maintenance personnel of the infantry battalion, being qualified in maintenance of wheeled vehicles only, could offer only limited support to the cavalry and artillery units toward accomplishment of their maintenance missions. Augmentation of track and artillery maintenance personnel is deemed a necessity.

(7) 3rd echelon maintenance was accomplished by contact teams of the 704th Maintenance Battalion. These teams were responsive to the needs of the task force, accomplishing their mission efficiently and within minimum time limits.

(8) Casualty evacuation and treatment. Problems existed in this area. The one "Dustoff" aircraft in the Ban Me Thout area was occasionally insufficient to accomplish necessary evacuation. To remedy the situation, the task force used its attached slicks for evacuation cases when multiple lifts were required. Furthermore, stationing of the "Dustoff" aircraft at Ban Me Thout complicated communications and delayed evacuation because of the 30 minute flight time involved. Patient treatment provided by the 563rd Clearing Company was considered excellent.

(9) Communications: Logistical and administrative communications between the task force's trains and Camp Enari was by VHF provided by the 124th Signal Battalion; communications between Camp Enari and the task force was consistently good.

(10) Material and supplies: A summary of material and supplies issued in support of HANCOCK I follows:

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(a) CLASS II

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>AVERAGE DAILY ISSUE</u>	<u>TOTAL ISSUE</u>	<u>WT. (ST)</u>
A	1500	19,800	18
<u>C</u>	<u>4170</u>	<u>51,000</u>	<u>57</u>
TOTAL	5670	73,800	75

(b) CLASS III

JP4	1750 (Gal)	47,200 (Gal)	141
MOGAS	230 (Gal)	6,210 (Gal)	18
DIESEL	<u>280 (Gal)</u>	<u>7,560 (Gal)</u>	<u>22</u>
TOTAL	2260 (Gal)	60,970 (Gal)	192

(c) CLASS IV

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TOTAL ISSUE</u>	<u>WEIGHT S/T</u>
Sandbags	75,000	9
Concertina (Bales)	12	11

(d) CLASS V

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY ROUNDS</u>	<u>WEIGHT S/T</u>
40MM (Gren)	1240	1
81mm	2200	10
4.2 inch	900	14
105mm	2500	44
<u>155mm</u>	<u>1100</u>	<u>53</u>
TOTAL	7940	122

(e) Water point issues: The water point issued a total of 100,000 gallons of water for an average daily usage of 3575 gallons.

(f) Recapitulation of supplies consumed: A total of 420 S/T of supplies were issued for an average daily total of 15 S/T.

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15. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) Item - Command Relationships

(a) Discussion: When working with allied forces at company or battalion level, either OPCOM or in conjunction and coordination with the task force, the task force commander must directly coordinate often.

(b) Observation: It was observed that if the commander coordinated directly with the allied commanders (not the staff) that the operations ran most smoothly.

(2) Item - Exchange of Information

(a) Discussion: During operation HANCOCK I the battalion was required to coordinate with 6 different agencies, doubling the work load of the battalion staff.

(b) It was found that the shortage of liaison officers in an environment such as Operation HANCOCK I can be critical. Liaison Officer strength should therefore be supplemented.

(3) Item - Intelligence Information

(a) Discussion: Intelligence information, which was gathered during the operation, started to form a picture of activity which could have been exploited at a later date.

(b) If a unit is deployed on an operation similar to HANCOCK I, it is vital that the unit stay as long as required to exploit intelligence information. Unit should only be pulled on emergency basis.

(4) Item - Coordination of fires between allied forces

(a) Discussion: Coordination of fires between allied and US units requires a US forward observer for flank or adjacent companies.

(b) It was observed that allied troops need a US observer when US artillery is employed, to provide them accurate fire and to bridge any language problems.

b. Recommendations: As indicated in lessons learned and commander's analysis.

16. (c) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: Because of the relatively short duration of Operation HANCOCK I, its success cannot be measured by the normal methods of friendly to enemy kill ration or area brought under GVN control. Instead its success or failure must be measured by other methods.

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
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Intelligence reports during Operation HANCOCK I confirmed that large numbers of the enemy operated within the AO. The enemy, however, probably presupposed, that if it avoided contact with US Forces, they would leave the area. At any rate, this was the enemy's obvious intent and in this respect Operation HANCOCK I was a failure because friendly forces could not close with the enemy. If, however, the operation had continued, the enemy would have had to make a stand in order to protect his infrastructure from being destroyed and losing control (which he then had but which was rapidly deteriorating) of the populace. An operation of the nature of HANCOCK I should have enough permanence to allow the populace to be brought under GVN control prior to removal of US Forces.

Of significant importance in measuring the success of Operation HANCOCK I is the cooperation between ARVN, CIDG and US Forces fostered during the operation and the aggressiveness instilled in ARVN and CIDG by the presence of US Forces. Throughout the operation, ARVN and CIDG were given responsible missions which contributed significantly to several plans. This policy encouraged the ARVN and CIDG and instilled a certain confidence heretofore not present.

Also significant were the areas in which units of the task force operated. Some areas had been considered sanctuaries of the VC by ARVN and CIDG and areas into which friendly forces should venture only at extreme risk. These beliefs were disproved and it is anticipated that ARVN and CIDG forces will in the future, operate quite freely in these areas.

In the final analysis, the increase in prestige and aggressiveness of ARVN and CIDG forces is in itself a significant return for the investment of time and effort made by US Forces in the HANCOCK I AO.



THOMAS P. LYNCH
LTC, Armor
Commanding

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PRINCIPAL COMMANDERS AND
PRIMARY STAFF OFFICERS

Principal commanders and primary staff officers participating in
HANCOCK I were:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>NAME</u>
3d Bn, 8th Inf	CO	LTC	LYNCH, Thomas P
	XO	MAJ	SILDAM, Are
	S3	MAJ	DAST, William A
	S1	CPT	HELLER, Stephen M
	S2	CPT	CLOSE, Harlow B
	S4	LLT	POMEROY, Ralph J
	CO, Co A	LLT	DORNEY, Christopher
		CPT	TAYLOR, John V Jr
	CO, Co B	LLT	MARINOVICH, Branko B
	CO, Co C	CPT	POWERS, James C
2d Battalion, 45th Regt (ARVN)	CO	MAJ	THEP, Dui Van
	Sr Adv	MAJ	WEIGAND, Robert D
A Battery, 4th Battalion, 16th Artillery	CO	CPT	GREEN, Thomas
C Battery, 6th Battalion 29th Artillery	CO	CPT	FREEMAN, Malcomb
1st Plat, A Troop, 1st Sqdn. 10th Cav	Plt Ldr	LLT	GRACE, Thomas
1st, Plat, A Company, 4th Engr	Plt Ldr	LLT	ARNELL, Paul
2d Plat, 170th Assault Helicopter Company	Plt Ldr	MAJ	MEADOWS, Thomas R

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Det B23, 5th SF Gp	CO	MAJ	JONES, James W
Det A238, 5th SF Gp	CO	CPT	JACK, James B
Det A233, 5th SF Gp	CO	CPT	WOLFE, Robert M
Buon Ho District Advisor	Sr Adv	MAJ	DOUGLAS, Lawrence W

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- (1) 29 April - Co A received 5 rounds of 60mm Mortar Fire vic BQ 073415.
- (2) 29 April - Co A discovered battalion size base camp used within 3 or 4 hours vic BQ 062403.
- (3) 29 April Co C discovered a way station used very recently vic BQ 079415.
- (4) 30 April - CIDG engaged unknown size VC force vic BQ 092467.
- (5) 1 May - Co C located and dug up 6 fresh graves containing bodies recently killed by artillery vic BQ 112427.
- (6) 1 May - Co B discovered company size base camp vic BQ 113413.
- (7) 2 May - Co B made contact with 3 armed VC vic BQ 124515.
- (8) 2 May - Co B discovered a bin of rice 10' by 8' by 5' containing 9,365 pounds unmilled rice vic BQ 141419.
- (9) 2 May - Co B made contact with 30 - 40 VC vic BQ 145415.
- (10) 2 May - Co C received small arms fire from estimated 10 VC vic BQ 145425.
- (11) 2 May - Co C captured one wounded VC vic BQ 150419.
- (12) 3 May - Co C discovered Company size base camp vic BQ 164417.
- (13) 3 May - CIDG made contact with 2 NVA entering village vic BQ 123423.
- (14) 3 May - Co A located a fording site with indications that an estimated force of 100 crossed within 12-18 hours to the east vic BQ 16315.
- (15) 4 May - Co B found a place where approximately 30 men had slept and cooked the previous day at BQ 119402.
- (16) 4 May - Co A found a small ammunition and clothing cache with 22 rounds of M79 ammo and assorted items of clothing vic BQ 175336.
- (17) 5 May - Co B discovered a platoon size base camp used within 10 days vic BQ 120399.
- (18) 5 May - 2d Bn 45th ARVN regiment made contact with estimated platoon of VC moving north vic BQ 175255.
- (19) 5 May - Co B found a weapons and ammunition cache containing 3 carbines, five 60mm illumination rounds, and 3000 rounds of small arms ammo vic BQ 155413.
- (20) 8 May - Recon Platoon discovered 12,000 pounds rice cache vic BQ 142306. Evacuated 9,000 pounds to District Headquarters, left 3,000 pounds for villagers.

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used in 2 months vic BQ 229338.

(23). 8 May - Co A discovered a platoon size base camp not used for 30 or 40 days vic BQ 244341.

(24). 9 May - Co B discovered and destroyed a company size base camp vic BQ 244325.

(25). 9 May - Co B discovered and destroyed a platoon size base camp approximately 40-50 days old vic BQ 246333.

(26). 9 May - CIDG made contact with 3-5 armed VC trying to enter village vic BQ 126428.

(27). 10 May - CIDG discovered one VC KIA from contact vic BQ 126428.

(28). 10 May - Co B discovered and destroyed a small base camp with 4 military structures and 3 artillery shelters vic BQ 250317.

(29). 10 May - Co B discovered and destroyed a small base camp with 3 artillery shelters not used in months vic BQ 250318.

(30). 10 May - Co C discovered and destroyed a platoon size base camp used in last 2 days vic BQ 235318.

(31). 11 May - Co B discovered and destroyed a battalion size training area and way station 30-40 days old vic BQ 235318.

(32). 11 May - Co B discovered and destroyed a battalion size base camp not used in about a year vic BQ 250335.

(33). 11 May - 2d Bn, 45th ARVN Regiment engaged squad size force moving north vic BQ 129321.

(34). 11 May - 3d Bn, 45th ARVN Regiment engaged squad size VC force vic BQ 173710.

(35). 12 May - Co B discovered one VC KIA killed by mortar fire about 2 days previously vic BQ 178322.

(36). 14 May - Co A received 15 rounds of semi-automatic fire from NW of his location vic AQ847238.

(37). 14 May - Co B contacted one VC vic AQ 819283.

(38). 14 May - Co A was shown location of one M1A1 AT Mine by a mortar vic AQ848207.

(39). 14 May - Recon Platoon discovered a way station for 12-15 persons used about 15 days ago vic AQ863264.

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(40). 14 May - Co C received 5 rounds sniper fire from one semi-automatic weapon vic AQ866227.

(41). 15 May - 3d Bn 8th Inf FSB received probe by 3 VC with grenades vic AQ865255.

(42). 15 May - Recon Platoon discovered and partially destroyed a base camp for up to 60 persons used about 3 weeks ago vic AQ847248.

(43). 15 May - Recon Platoon made contact with one VC vic AQ848255.

(44). 15 May - Recon Platoon discovered an old battalion size base camp vic AQ 846252 to AQ849255.

(45). 16 May - Co B engaged 3 armed VC traveling west vic AQ827309.

(46). 16 May - CIDG reported a battalion size base camp not recently used vic AQ800314.

(47). 16 May - Co B discovered a small, 3 man base camp used night before and the same morning vic AQ833314.

(48). 16 May - Co B discovered a platoon size base camp used 2 days previously vic AQ848318.

(49). 17 May - LRRP spotted 31 NVA moving ESE, 20 or 22 armed, all carried heavily loaded packs vic AQ984413.

(50). 17 May - CIDG contacted 3 NVA moving on trail vic BQ872390.

(51). 17 May - CIDG discovered a battalion size base camp not used vic AQ852369.

(52). 18 May - CIDG made contact with 10 NVA vic AQ870418.

(53). 18 May - CIDG engaged 2 armed VC entering village vic AQ873413.

(54). 18 May - CIDG received 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from NW direction vic AQ873413.

(55). 18 May - CIDG made contact with 3 NVA vic AQ873413.

(56). 19 May - CIDG sighted 40-50 VC in open moving WSW vic AQ862410.

(57). 19 May - 2d Bn, 45th ARVN Regiment engaged unknown size VC force from ambush vic AQ900440.

(58). 19 May - Co B discovered and destroyed a base camp with 4 military structures in location where H-5 District Hqs was reported to be vic AQ909322.

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(59). 20 May - CIDG discovered and destroyed a battalion size base camp vic AQ850425.

(60). 20 May - CIDG discovered and extracted a medical cache. Area appeared to be a major storage point for a VC regiment size hospital vic AQ840425. Area used same morning.

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SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT
EVENTS

24 April 1967: 3d Bn 8th Infantry (-) moves by convoy (Bn TOC and trains) and CH-47 airlift (B and C Companies) to Camp Enari. Departed 1000 hours closed at 1645 hours.

25 April 1967: Preparation for move to FSB AQ985433.

26 April 1967: 1st March Unit, land convoy, crossed SP at 0628 hours enroute to new FSB. Land convoy closed at 1530 hours. CH-47 lift of A and C Companies began 1355 hours from Camp Enari, last CH-57 closed FSB 1600 hours. A and C Companies began search and destroy to East. Company B provided FSB security.

27 April 1967: Company C picked up one detainee 0845 hours. Convoy departed Ban Blech with excess vehicles (67 each) to return to Camp Enari. 2 CIDG Companies (A-238) initiated search and destroy operations to southeast.

28 April 1967: 0718 - Company C found a barrel of punji stakes (BQ055455). 0925 - Company A found firing positions for 15 persons, some dug in, some not, 5 days old; 1535 - Company A found many trails leading East and many foottracks. Trails were cut by machete.

29 April 1967: 0104 - Company A received 5 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. Rounds landed between 2nd and 3rd platoons. Results 5 US WIA (all light, no dust off required). 0735 - Recon Platoon spotted 2 VC crossing a stream BQ975417, mortar fire called in; results 1 VC KIA (DC). Estimated 5 people had been in the area; sighted 2 running west, pursued, negative results. 0914 - Eagle Flight inserted BQ033462. 1210 - Company A found base camp with 75 foxholes and bunkers, no overhead cover and 6 kitchens, vic coordinates BQ081414. 1240 - Recon platoon found 600 pounds of rice at coordinates AQ953406. Rice extracted. 1335 - 1st platoon of Company A found 15 dummy Chicom grenades. 1515 - Company found 1 SKS, 1 ea MG Magazine and 1 ea AK 47 magazine. 1923 - Company A found 46 Chicom grenades, 200 pounds small arms ammo, 1 pair of binoculars, 15 entrenching tools. 1 pound of marijuana and 1 SKS carbine vic coordinates BQ058403.

30 April 1967 - Moved FSB from AQ985433 to coordinates BQ127328. Company B moved by UH1D with first lift off at 0800, closed 1000. CH-47 sortie for C/6/29 and Bn Hqs departed 0825 closed 1000. Convoy for A/5/16 (SP) departed 1125 hours closed 1252. ARVN convoy departed Ban Me Thout 1525 hours closed 1730 hours. 300730 - CJDG (A 238) engaged unknown size enemy force, results 3 VC KIA (BC) 2 carbines, 1 SKS and 3 rucksacks. Action occurred coordinates BQ092467; enemy moved north.

1 May 1967: 0918 - Company B started lift into AO; completed 1024 hours. Company A started lift into FSB 0929 hours completed 1017 hours. 1615 - Company C's second platoon found 6 fresh graves vic coordinates BQ112427. Bodies dressed in tiger fatigues. Death was determined to be from artillery fire.

INCLOSURE 5

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2 May 1967: 0815 - Company B made contact with 3 VC vic BQ 125415, results 2 VC KIA (BC), 2 AK-47s captured. 1205 - Company B found a bin of rice size 10' x 8' x 5' at coordinates BQ141418, trail existed leading to rice. 1315 - Company C received 1 round of sniper fire vic coordinates BQ147420. Company B contacted unknown size enemy force vicinity coordinates BQ145415. 1650 - Company C found 1 NVA WIA - result of contact. 1735 - Company B found 1 ½ tons of rice vicinity BQ145421. Rice was destroyed.

3 May 1967: 0740 - Company C found company size base camp, 35 bunkers with overhead cover, vic BQ163416. 0830 - CIDG (A 238) ambush vic coordinates BQ127427 fired at 2 NVA (appeared to be cooks with 2 hand grenades, results (2) NVA KIA (BC). 1115 - Completed airmobile exchange of 1 CIDG company.

4 May 1967: 1330 - Company B found a large way station for 50 people, coordinates BQ110402.

5 May 1967: 1330 - Company B found platoon size base camp (40 bunkers) BQ120399.

6 May 1967: ARVN N-3 Company apprehended (1) Chieu Hoi w/M-1 Carbine at BQ194244.

7 May 1967: 0715 - Began lift of Company A and C/6/29 to new FSB (coordinates BQ187343) closed 1035 hours. Exchanged companies A-238 at 0900. 0807 - Recon platoon found 12,000 pounds of rice at BQ142305. Evacuated 9,000 lbs and 3,000 lbs left for villagers. 1328 - VC snipers fired at Company B 1st platoon, results 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA (died later). 1800 hours Company B found battalion size base camp vic BQ244341.

9 May 1967: 1618 - FAC reported F-100, while conducting airstrike, receive automatic weapons fire, from BQ273287. 091911. CIDG (A 238) made contact with 3-5 VC or NVA vic coordinates BQ126428. Results 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 AK 47, 1 M2 Carbine and one additional body found next morning. Body looked chinese.

10 May 1967: 0745 - CIDG (A 238) made contact with 3 - 5 VC. Results 1 VC KIA (BC).

11 May 1967: 0945 - ARVN N-3 Company made contact with estimated VC squad, results 2 VC KIA (BC), 1 SKS rifle and 1 pair binoculars captured. 1300 - Company A and C/6/29 returned to FSB by Ch-47 with final extraction by UH-1D; closed 1450 hours.

12 May 1967: CIDG exchanged companies in the field by airmobile operation. Exchange began 0930 - completed 1200 .

13 May 1967: 0510 - FSB began to move to AQ867251 by convoy, UH-1D and CH-47. Companies moved into 3 different LZs; A Company AQ846235; B Company AQ846246, Company C AQ876232. Also air assaulted CIDG (A238) 2 companies to coordinates A191369, and A 233 (Ban Dou) moved into MIAAL area from the west. Moves began 0510 hours and all units closed 1630 hours. 1630 hours UH1D crashed west of Ban Me Thout while conducting combat assault. Pilot and copilot seriously injured, gunners had minor injuries; aircraft was totally destroyed.

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14 May 1967: 0507 - Convoy which brought vehicles down for movement of the trains on 13 May departed Ban Me Thout for Camp Enari. 0825 - Company A received 15 rounds of sniper fire. Estimated one sniper firing single shot, results negative. 1050 - Company B observed 1 VC; results 1 VC KIA (BC); 1 M1 Carbine (Mod), 15 rounds ammo and a pistol belt captured. 1100 Company A led by a Montanyard Village Chief found one antitank mine. Mine blown in place. 1420 - Company C received 5 rounds of sniper fire, negative results.

15 May 1967: 0304 FSB AQ867251 received 3 hand grenades thrown into perimeter, three individuals seen fleeing, taken under fire, with negative results. 1015 - National Police with Company B (AQ823279) picked up 3 detainees (no ID cards).

16 May 1967: 1115 - Company B had contact (AQ827309) with 3 VC heading West, results (2) VC KIA (BC); 2 SKS, pistol belt and bayonet captured. 1705 hours RF/PF picked up 3 VCs and 2 deserters.

17 May 1967: 0932 - Resupply ship "Bikini 815" fired on at AQ826224, 10-15 rounds automatic weapon fire. 1650 - LRRPs extracted. Gunships employed against 32 NVA observed by LRRP Platoon leader, negative results. 1745 - District Headquarters received information reference to 2 mines vic AQ842201 and AQ852210. Not able to take action due to present disposition of forces.

18 May 1967: 0910 - Moved from FSB to original FSB coordinates AQ985433. Closed new FSB at 1000 hours. The new FSB includes the Bn Hqs and 155 Battery (which moved by convoy overland); Company B secured 105 FSB by 0717 hours. 105 battery closed 0915. 2025 - CIDG (238) received incoming mortar fire, approximately 50 rounds (60mm) from vic AQ873414. Employed artillery. Results of enemy mortar fire, 3 CIDG WIA.

19 May 1967: 0640 0 CIDG (A 238) observed 40 - 50 VC in open, called in artillery, results negative. Sector FAC checked the area vic coordinates AQ862410. 0815 - Company A contacted 3 people vic AQ942425. Persons ran when approached, engaged with small arms, pursued, negative results. 0900 - Company B found company size base camp vic AQ909385.

20 May 1967: 0920 RF/PF sector reported at 0430 hours this morning a village coordinates BQ0710 overrun by estimated VC Company. Attack continued until 0830 hours. 1345 - S-5 reported he had 2 Chieh Hoi, (1) carbine, (1) Springfield (03), 6 detainees and (1) man who states he knows where a weapon is. 1430 - S-5 picked up 1 more carbine. 1540 S-5 picked up 10 more detainees (9 admitted to being VC). 1545 - S-5 returned to FSB.

21 May 1967: 0825 - Company C's first platoon found company size base camp BQ857440. 1240 - Company A began airlift from AO to FSB vic AQ985433 hours. 1420 - first lift of Company A to Jackson Hole, closed at 1820 hours. 1445 - Convoy of 26-2 1/2 ton trucks, 4th S&T 10 ton trucks (4) and 1 lowboy departed trains in route from Camp Enari to the FSB. 1550 - first lift of Company C to Jackson Hole, closed 1815 hours. ARVN 2/45 closed at FSB proceed

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to Ban Me Thout, time 1645 hours.

22 May 1967: 0845 - C Battery, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery began move to FSB; vic AQ 985433, closed 1215 hours. 1200 - Hq 3/8 (-), 1/A/1/10 (-), A/5/16 (-); trains 3/8 departed FSB for Jackson Hole, closed 2105 hours. 1630 - Hq 3/8 (-), 1/A/1/10 Cav (-), C/6/29 Arty departed FSB and closed CP 51 at 1830 hours. 1240 - Company B airlifted from FSB to Jackson Hole, closed 1330 hours. 2105 - Bn Cmd Gp closed Jackson Hole and Battalion reverted to control of 1st Bde, 4th Div.

23 May 1967 - 1230 - Convoy closed Jackson Hole returning all of Task Force to Jackson Hole or Camp Enari.

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