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AFTER  
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AFTER ACTION INTERVIEWS

CONTACT

COMPANY D, 3D BATTALION, 8TH INFANTRY  
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION


26 MARCH 1968

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
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The following is a narrative account of the contact between the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division and an estimated two North Vietnamese Army battalions from the 209th NVA Regiment, at YA939913 on the morning of 26 March 1968. It is based on interviews with the following individuals:

1. Cpt Robert B Brown, OF , Infantry, CO, D/3-8 , Morgantown, West Virginia, DEROS 4 Jan 69, 25 years old, 3 years, 9 months in service.
2. 1LT Edwin Thomas Osler Jr. , Infantry, 1st Plt Ldr, D/3-8, Arlington, Virginia, DEROS 1 Sep 68, 21 years old, 1 year, 11 months in service.
3. 1LT Gary B. Kankel, , Artillery, Forward Observer from C/6-29 Artillery for D/3-8 Infantry, Los Gatos, California, DEROS Oct 68, 25 years old, 2 years time in service.
4. SP4 Johnny Sweet, US , Squad Leader, 3d Platoon, D/3-8 Infantry, Poteau, Oklahoma, DEROS Sep 68, 23 years old, 1 year in service.
5. PFC Lonnie Kirby, US , RTO for 1st Sgt, D/3-8 Infantry, Orlando, Oklahoma, 20 years old, 1 year in service, WIA
6. PFC Erwing Christoph, US , RTO for 2d Platoon, D/3-8 Infantry, Detroit, Michigan, DEROS Nov 68, 1 year in service
7. PFC Robert McMullen, US , RTO for the company commander, D/3-8 Infantry, Laketon, Florida, DEROS Nov 68, 20 years old, 1 year in service.
8. SSG George D. Kenniston, , Platoon Sgt, 4th Platoon, D/3-8 Infantry, Epping, New Hampshire, DEROS Aug 68, 37 years old, 17 years time in service, 2d RVN tour, WIA.
9. Cpt Jim D. Moody, , Armor, S3 Air, Waco, Texas, DEROS 17 Jan 69, 24 years old, 2 years, 5 months in service, WIA.
10. Cpt Robert M Frey, / Battery Commander, C/6-29 Artillery, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, DEROS 19 Jul 68, 25 years old, 3 years time in service.
11. 1LT Jeffrey R. Forbes, , Artillery, Forward Observer from C/6-29 Artillery for C/3-8 Infantry, Beverly Farms, Massachusetts, DEROS Sep 68, 26 years old, 16 months time in service.



12. SSG James E Bradley, RA , Chief of Firing Battery, C/6-29 Artillery, Rusk, Texas, DEROS 10 Aug 68, 27 years old, 10 years time in service.
13. SGT Wayne N. Olds, US , Chief of section C/6-29 Artillery Stevens Point, Wisconsin, DEROS 8 Aug 68, 20 years old, 18 months time in service.
14. SGT Richard C Scanie, US , Chief of Section, C/6-29 Artillery, New York, New York, DEROS 7 Aug 68, 20 years old, 18 months in service.
15. SP4 John F O'Daniel, US , 19 years old, C/6-29 Artillery, Henderson, Kentucky, DEROS 14 Aug 68, 18 months in service.
16. Cpt Nathan A. Lanford, OF , Commanding Officer Company A, 3-8th Infantry, Hobbs, N.M., DEROS 14 July 68, 27 years old, 3 years 10 months in service.
17. Cpt Robert J. Robillard, , Fire Support Coordinator, HHB/6-29th Arty, Lawton, Okla, DEROS 1 Jan 69, 26 years old, 8 years in service.

The interviews with the first nine individuals were conducted at Camp Enari Base Camp and at the 71st Evacuation Hospital in PLEIKU on 27 March; with the next six at the scene of the contact on 28 March; and with the last two at DAK TO on 7 April 1968; by Captain Peter L Sawin and First Lieutenant Francis W Greel of the 29th Military History Detachment.


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GENERAL SITUATION

Intelligence


On 18 March documents were captured at YA 835940 which indicated the presence of the 15th NVA Engineer Battalion, an element of the 1st NVA Division. Visual reconnaissance and other intelligence confirmed the presence of a large enemy force in the area. On 22 March Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol 14 made contact with a group of NVA and killed five at YA 848925. It had been discovered earlier that the NVA were constructing a road from the Cambodian border into the mountains west of Kontum.

NVA ROAD NETWORK - MARCH 68



Contacts Preceding the Battle<sup>1</sup>

21 March. Companies A and D conducted a combat assault into the landing zone at YA 939913. Light automatic weapons fire was received, resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA. This location was the fire base



which was the objective of the NVA assault on 26 March.

22 March. Company A patrolled two kilometers to the southwest. Company D initiated patrolling actions to the north on the ridgeline which runs to the north. Contact was made at a point 450 meters from the fire base when two NVA got up and began to flee. The patrol fired at them, probably wounding one. The NVA returned fire, wounding the platoon leader. The remainder of the company moved up to secure an LZ for evacuation of the wounded platoon leader. After the evacuation, the company moved to the original point of contact and again was taken under fire. Several US were wounded. These wounded were evacuated and the company pulled back to the fire base, picked up its rucksacks and moved back up the ridge to establish a night location.

23 March. Company D moved out to the area of the 22 March contact. Elements of the company entered a "V" shaped ambush of 12-13 NVA and received small arms and automatic weapons fire. Three US were wounded. After the wounded were evacuated, the company pulled back and called in airstrikes, which uncovered nine bunkers. The company again advanced but encountered machine gun and flamethrower fire. The point man was killed and four others wounded. Company C had, in the meantime, moved from the fire base to Company D's night location. Company D also moved back and a two company night location was established.

24 March. Company C led out. By slipping down below the western crest of the ridge, the company was able to bypass the NVA positions and advance 150-200 meters beyond the point of the previous day's contact. Company D, staying on top of the ridge, followed up but immediately came under sniper fire from NVA in spider holes. One platoon advanced through the NVA

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


FIG 1

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
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positions, killing seven enemy and suffering one killed and two wounded. Company C, further up the ridge, killed six of 15 NVA who had rushed them from the north. The company also found three NVA killed by the airstrikes. All the NVA were well equipped, to include steel helmets. Before dark fell, the companies withdrew to their previous night location.<sup>2</sup>

25 March. Companies A and B, which had been in the fire base, moved out to replace Companies C and D. Company B led out and moved forward to regain the ground Company C had briefly occupied on the previous day. The unit moved in a three file formation with a drag platoon providing rear security. Company A moved down the ridge and secured the night location. At approximately 1600 hours, Companies C and D moved back to the fire base, with C taking the east and D the west end of the perimeter. The dividing line for the two companies was a north-south line through the perimeter. The west end of the perimeter, which Company D had occupied for one night after the initial assault into the LZ, had seen little improvement in the meantime. The bunkers were small, shallow and had little if any overhead cover.<sup>3</sup> The company was fatigued after four days of combat, but spent a good deal of the remaining daylight improving the bunkers, after which it enjoyed its first hot meal in a week. Each platoon put out a listening post 25-50 meters away from the perimeter. Fields of fire had been cleared out to a distance of 20 meters and the LP's were in the woodline. By 1900 hours the company had started bedding down, and by 2200 hours everybody but the security shifts was asleep.

#### The Battle


Shortly after midnight, the 1st Platoon listening post reported hearing movement and voices. Captain Brown, the Company Commander, Company D, instructed them to throw their hand grenades, blow their claymore mines and return to the perimeter. The LP stayed in the perimeter for 15 minutes



and then was sent out again. Ten minutes later the LP again heard movement and voices. Again they threw hand grenades, but this time received enemy grenades in return. Simultaneously, the 3d and 4th Platoon LP's reported movement in their sectors. After the LP's returned to the perimeter, the 1st Platoon Leader, LLT Osler, borrowed a 90mm recoilless rifle and fired two canister rounds in the direction of the movement. The LP's returned to their posts outside the perimeter, and things were relatively quiet for a while. The perimeter had been probed the preceding four nights straight, so Cpt Brown was not overly alarmed by the activity and decided not to order a 100% alert. For the same reason and for the additional reason that the fire base was on the gun target line from Polei Kleng, he did not request artillery. In retrospect, he regrets these decisions, but acknowledges them as entirely his own. Shortly after 0300 hours, the LP's in the 3d and 4th Platoon sectors again reported movement. They prepared to blow their claymore mines. At that moment all trip flares on the northwest side of the perimeter went off and the first of approximately 30 mortar rounds fell into the western side of the perimeter, accompanied by approximately 20 B-40 rocket rounds and several flamethrower bursts, aimed primarily at the perimeter bunkers. The 3d and 4th Platoon LP's blew their claymores and scrambled and low-crawled back into the perimeter. None of them, surprisingly, was injured. But a large number of NVA were already ahead of them, assaulting the bunkers with grenades, satchel charges and small arms fire. An enemy heavy machine gun raked the perimeter from the south. The 3d Platoon's left flank bunker was knocked out by the initial B-40 and flamethrower assault. Three NVA appeared before a 2d Platoon bunker within seconds after the mortar rounds came in, and it quickly became apparent that the brunt of the attack was directed against that sector. The attack was so sudden and massive that many of the infantrymen,







shocked out of their sleep and thinking only of the mortars, scrambled into the bunkers without their weapons and without sufficient ammunition.

In Specialist Fourth Class Sweet's bunker in the 3d Platoon sector, there were only an M-16, an M-79 and a .38 pistol to defend with. The M-16 jammed. Another M-16 jammed in a 2d Platoon bunker. Most of the infantrymen had left their cleaning rods with their packs and were unable to clear the weapons which had failed to eject. Private First Class Christoph's gear was set afire by a flamethrower and a small arms round destroyed the camera in his pack. Two squad leaders in the 2d Platoon ordered their men back to the artillery parapets and, alone in the bunkers, covered their withdrawal. Both were found dead in the morning, one of them lying beside a dead NVA soldier wearing the squad leader's steel helmet. SSG Voshell, the 2d Platoon leader, made his way to the 1st Platoon sector and told Lt Osler the NVA had breached the perimeter. He wanted to know what he should do. Osler noticed that Voshell did not have his weapon. He advised him to withdraw to the first parapet. Osler was unable to refer the decision to the Company Commander because when he had left his bunker to check his positions, he had decided to leave behind his radio, not wanting to be burdened by it nor wanting to expose his RTO for what he thought would be a brief sortie out and back. When the 2d Platoon pulled back, Lt Osler felt that, with his right flank exposed, he had no choice but to do likewise and ordered his men to leapfrog back to the parapets. His radio remained in the bunker.

The 3d and 4th Platoons held firm. Sweet said his platoon briefly considered pulling back after its left flank bunker was knocked out, but decided it would have a better chance if it stayed. But the angle of the terrain in front of the bunkers was such that the men had to rise up and fire down, exposing themselves, in order to put effective fire down


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the side of the hill. Sweet said that he could see his M-79 rounds skipping down the side of the hill kicking up dust before they exploded. The 4th Platoon had five bunkers, and in the center and slightly to the front of them a caliber .50 machine gun had been emplaced. By traversing all the way left, it was able to deliver almost grazing fire along the side of the hill. When a B-40 rocket hit nearby the men on the gun jumped or were knocked aside, and the gun was temporarily unmanned while they engaged the enemy infantry and suppressed the B-40 launcher with small arms fire. The gun was remanned and again put into operation.

When the attack started Cpt Brown left the command post bunker and attempted to obtain an estimate of the situation from the battery area. He discovered that the 2d Platoon bunkers had been overrun and because he could not get radio contact with the 3d Platoon assumed that it also had been overrun. Despite this, his initial order was for the company to attempt to reestablish the perimeter and fight from the bunkers. When it later became apparent that this might not be possible, he permitted the platoons to withdraw to the parapets at their discretion. He also requested immediate HE support from the artillery and illumination from the mortars. The battalion requested SPOOKY, which arrived 25 minutes after requested, but was used only in its illumination capacity initially.

PFC Kirby, the 1st Sgt's RTO, followed Cpt Brown out of the CP bunker. He saw the company headquarter's medic, SP5 Michael A. Fay, make his way to the bunker line with two sandbags full of grenades. Fay, awarded the Silver Star for heroism the preceding day, attempted to give treatment to the wounded in the hardest hit bunkers, but was killed during the subsequent fighting. Kirby was knocked unconscious by the concussion from a B-40 round shortly afterwards.



The infantry on the line who had not been separated from their weapons put out an intense volume of fire in between dodging the enemy mortars and rockets. PFC Johnny Ragsdale, the 1st Platoon's M-60 machine gunner, expended 10,000 rounds during the contact, much of it during the initial onslaught. Lt Osler credits Ragsdale with killing at least a dozen NVA snipers. Grenades, because of the slope up which the NVA assaulted and, later, because of the parapets behind which they took cover, became one of the most valuable of the weapons organic to the infantry and at times during the contact were in critically short supply. Various carrying parties were formed to effect resupply, notably the 12 man party organized by the Engineer Platoon Leader, 1 Lt Steve Gerlach. The 1st Sergeant of Company D also organized a party. At one point a 3d Platoon bunker yelled up to the artillery for more ammunition. A box full was hurled over the edge of the parapet and landed beside the bunker. The box, containing 1000 rounds of M-16 ammunition, was retrieved by the personnel in the bunker. The company commander's RTO set his radio up in a bunker for Cpt Brown and started carrying ammunition down to the line.

It seems apparent that many of the artillery personnel remained in their personnel bunkers through the worst part of the attack. But there were notable exceptions. Sgt. Scanio, section chief of the base piece, was out fighting the fires which threatened to detonate the ammo stores shortly after the initial attack. He was aided by PFC Carpenter until Carpenter rose up too high and was wounded by a sniper. SP4 Dennis Smith, on Gun 4, also went out to put out the fires, not even stopping when a salvo of mortar rounds started dropping in. SSG Bradley attempted to leave his bunker three times and each time was driven back in by mortar rounds impacting nearby. When he finally made it into the parapet, he was still a bit unnerved

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


FIG 3

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by the intensity of the enemy fire and at the prospect of firing at the enemy with the probability that there were still live Americans in the line of fire. An enemy grenade landed on top of the ammo bunker, instantly killing an infantryman in the parapet and setting Lt. Gerlach on fire. The lieutenant crawled across the parapet and into a bunker, where he died. The grenade had apparently come from the #5 gun parapet, and SSG Bradley cautioned his people against throwing grenades back because he wasn't sure the crew of #5 were dead. One of Scanio's men brought up an M-60 machine gun, but again Bradley told his people not to fire. An infantryman in the parapet asked for the gun and it was given to him. He raised himself above the parapet and fired a long burst. He came down to reload while Scanio gave him supporting fire. When he rose to fire again he was hit in the head by a sniper and killed. This had an immediate effect on Bradley. "He had balls enough to get up and try to fight," he said, "so I had to do the best I could to try to help him." With the battery commander, SP4 Smith, some TOC personnel and a couple of infantrymen, Bradley moved cautiously into the #4 gun parapet, shifted trails and fired the first round of beehive. The tide of the battle turned at that moment.

Less than an hour after the attack started, Cpt Brown decided that the support of the artillery firing direct fire beehive would be necessary to repel the NVA attackers. He called Cpt Frey and made the request. The battery commander refused to comply. In Cpt Brown's words, a "pissing contest" ensued, with the infantry commander maintaining that his people in the bunkers were either already dead or fatally wounded, since the NVA were in possession of the bunkers he wanted to fire at, and with Frey unwilling to accept the responsibility without an order from higher. Brown appealed to the battalion commander, who ordered the mission fired. A half hour had elapsed since the original request.<sup>4</sup>

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Cpt Jim Moody, the battalion S3-Air, was preparing to go on shift when the battle erupted. He went to the Black CP, the forward logistical point, and monitored the command net to find out what was going on. Then he went to the battalion CP. There the battalion commander directed him to take a radio down to the battery area and try to straighten out the artillery fires, which were largely ineffective at the time.<sup>5</sup> Moody was surprised by the sight the battery presented when he came down. "The artillery bunkers and parapets were in a mess; it looked like possibly some of their own shells had gone up." At first, he "couldn't seem to find any artillery personnel around." Moody brought the first of the airstrikes in at approximately this time.

Nine kilometers to the east, 155's were firing in support of the contact. Lt Kankel, Company D FO, was trying to adjust them in and at the same time give firing data to the mortar platoon, which was originally given the mission of providing illumination, but also had to try to silence the enemy mortars in the valley to the northwest. The 105's on the hill were also trying to knock them out, putting out, when the crews were not dodging incoming rounds, a steady volume of HE and WP into the valley. Sgt Olds had to roll his gun down to the edge of the parapet and depress the tube to obtain the angle of fire he needed. Halfway through the battle the FO from Company C, Lt Forbes, came down to assist Lt Kankel, since his company was only in light contact on the east side. They faced some difficult problems, problems of which the NVA were probably aware when they chose their avenue of approach. The direction of attack placed the entire fire base directly under the gun-target line. Further, by choosing the steepest slope the NVA caused minor errors of adjustment to telescope into major errors. The CP line presented the first major problem. Lt Forbes was still on his

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side of the perimeter when it happened. "We started taking rounds," he said, "which we initially thought were B-40 right by our position, and 68 (Company B FO).. told us that the rounds were corresponding to the shots from the 155." Forbes called a check-fire, added 400 and started bringing them back in towards the west edge of the perimeter. Forbes made his way to Cpt Frey's position shortly after Gun 5 had been retaken, talked briefly with the battery commander, then carried a request for more medics to the CO of Company C. Then he started working with Lt Kankel again, and it was only this late in the battle that even "partial success" was achieved with the 155 fires. Up to that point it was stray rounds that had inflicted the most damage on the enemy. One round landed directly in front of one of the bunkers that had been overrun though no one had as yet deliberately adjusted the fires in that close. Another round landed between the FDC and the #3 gun ammo bunker, almost directly in the center of the battery area. A third round landed inside the parapet of the #5 gun after it had been retaken and after Cpt Moody had been wounded.<sup>6</sup> Amazingly, no one was killed by this round, although Lt Osler was thrown out of the parapet by the blast, landing behind a 55-gallon drum outside the parapet. An estimated 20 NVA were killed by these stray rounds. SP4 O'Daniel expressed the consensus: "At the time I was pretty mad, but the next morning when I got down the hill and saw what it had done, I was pretty happy, all those gooks laying around."

Prior to all this, after calling in the first two airstrikes, Cpt Moody had finally found the battery commander in gun parapet #4, shortly after the beehive rounds started going out. "That beehive had really shook them up," Moody declared. Merely the psychological effect of the beehive was enough for Frey and Moody to feel that they could now retake


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the #5 gun with the motley force they had assembled. After firing the beehives, SSG Bradley had gone back up and rounded up all his able-bodied artillery people out of the bunkers, and with them, the infantry and the headquarters personnel they had approximately 50 men with which to launch the counterattack. At 0515 hours they reported they were beginning their assault. At 0545 hours the gun was retaken.

The gun was found to be unfireable, but it is not known when or by whose fire it was damaged; and, as Frey said, "if the NVA would have taken that howitzer they undoubtedly could have turned it on the rest of the battery ... and fought their way through the battery." That they were unable to do so was due largely to the tenacity of its crew, six men who retreated only as far as the personnel bunker next to the parapet and from there kept the NVA from firing the piece. In the course of the battle two grenades exploded inside the bunker, wounding all six men. "The next morning," Frey added, "we found four NVA in the bunker itself, one of which a man strangled with his bare hands when he ran out of ammunition."

Cpt Moody had picked up a grenadier when he came down to the parapets, and after gun #5 was retaken he began to direct the grenadier's fire against the line bunkers still held by the NVA. The soldier fired a few rounds, then stopped. Moody turned to give him further instructions. At that moment an enemy grenade or B-40 round, Moody is not sure which, impacted nearby. Moody went down screaming, a piece of shrapnel imbedded in his liver. Despite his wound, he continued to direct the airstrikes. Previous to this he had directed two airstrikes into the streambed running northwest, about 300 meters from the perimeter. This, Moody felt, was the NVA assembly area. The third one he brought in a hundred meters closer. The






20mm strafing runs were perhaps as close as 50 meters to the perimeter.

The S2 Sergeant had come down to the battery while the NVA were in possession of the #5 gun and threatening #4. After #4 was secured, he went back up and commandeered an artilleryman from one of the pieces, Specialist O'Daniel. "An infantry sergeant," O'Daniel recalled, "came by and snatched me off the gun, said he needed some help. I wasn't too happy about going, but I went down to Gun 5 and he kind of lost me. When he found me again, he wanted to drag me down to the perimeter with him, so I went with him." Moody was there too. "There were two NVA in one of the bunkers," he said. "The S2 Sergeant tossed a grenade in and one went down. The other one dashed out and he shot him down." O'Daniel also fired at the fleeing NVA and thinks he may have helped bring him down.

According to Cpt Brown and other witnesses, the NVA at one point attempted to man the 106mm recoilless rifle on the west end and deliver fire against the bunkers which had not fallen in the initial onslaught. But the NVA were driven off and the rifle damaged beyond use by a beehive round. But this was only a coincidental effect, for the artillerymen had not been aware of the danger and had just happened to fire a round in that direction at that particular time.

Approximately an hour after the beginning of the attack, Cpt Brown requested reinforcements, and battalion ordered Company A to move from their night location into the firebase. The company started moving out but was almost immediately pinned down by small arms and automatic weapons fire. One soldier was killed by the enemy blocking force, and there was little space on the saddle for maneuvering. SSG Kenniston, Delta Company's 4th Platoon Sergeant, said that he could see the enemy muzzle flashes from his position, and his men fired at the flashes in an effort to spring the company



loose; but the NVA held the Americans down for another hour, despite Kenniston's belief that his fire did kill a few of the enemy soldiers.<sup>7</sup>

Once Gun 5 was retaken it was evident that the danger of being overrun was past, barring another human wave assault by the NVA. SSG Bradley's first beehive round was followed by 13 more in a 30-minute period. Five more were fired at wider intervals for good measure. Frey said that one of the rounds wiped out an entire sapper squad moving up the side of the hill.

As daylight was breaking, Company A managed to maneuver its way into the perimeter on the east side. They stopped a moment to catch their breath, then meandered a while, not sure where they were needed. Lt Forbes stood up and waved his arm and finally caught their attention. They joined with Forbes at the battalion CP, and he guided them into the battery positions.

From the beleaguered west end's viewpoint, the arrival of Company A, "a headlong, John Wayne movie-type charge" in Cpt Brown's description, was a glorious sight; and with the rising sun and the flag still waving on its frail staff above the TOC behind them, the soldiers undoubtedly gave the surviving defenders an unforgettable memory.

But the heroics were not over. A chopper pilot bringing in a Class V sling load aroused Cpt Brown's admiration. "One of the hottest pilots I believe I've ever seen...he was forced to hover directly over the battalion TOC...we were still receiving incoming B-40 rounds, possibly some mortars, and quite a bit of small arms fire...he was also directly on the GT line for the artillery," apparently having trouble disengaging his sling. "To me," said Brown, "it seemed like 20 minutes that he hovered; I'm sure it wasn't much more than 30 seconds." Finally the sling load dropped, and the pilot flew away unscathed.

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Within 30 minutes Company A had reoccupied the bunker line. Sporadic enemy fire continued until 0830 hours, then ceased. Artillery and air continued to pound the suspected escape routes, while the survivors on the hill began counting their dead and evacuating their wounded.

#### ANALYSIS:

US casualties from this contact were moderate: 19 killed and 51 wounded, 11 of the dead and 21 of the wounded from Company D, which had a strength of 86 EM and three officers prior to the battle. A breakdown of Company D's casualties by platoon provides an interesting note: the first platoon suffered no casualties; the second platoon had two killed and six wounded; the third platoon had three killed and eight wounded; and the fourth platoon had six killed and six wounded. As seems so often to happen in combat, the extent of a unit's casualties is not a proportional indicator of its capacity to fight on, nor of the amount of enemy force directed against it. The fourth platoon suffered the heaviest casualties, but held; the second platoon was physically assaulted the hardest, but suffered fewer casualties notwithstanding. When it is remembered that the fourth platoon was on the fringe of the assault wave, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the old Asian-Communist tactic of the human-wave assault achieved, if only briefly, a measure of success in this contact, pushing the second platoon back as much by psychological as by physical force -- which is the only worthwhile goal of such a costly tactic. And ultimately the NVA had to write it all off as a total loss and abandon their inroad when their tactic was answered by one even more terrifying: not a wave of screaming soldiers but a wave of flechettes and the shock wave thrown out by a close-range, direct-fire artillery piece.

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At the end of the battle 135 NVA bodies were found around and inside the perimeter. None of the interviewees seemed willing to make an estimate of how many were wounded. But it can be speculated that the number is considerable for the following reason: The contour of the terrain generally prevented anything like grazing fire from being delivered (except for the caliber .50 machine gun of the fourth platoon), and the consequent heavy reliance on fragmentation weapons -- hand grenades, M-79, and beehives -- increases the likelihood that numerous, non-fatal fragmentation wounds were sustained by the attackers. The US wounded-to-killed ratio was almost 2.7/1, but it is doubtful that the enemy ratio was that high, for the following reasons: the US first-aid personnel, medevac capability and surgical skills in the rear undoubtedly saved several lives and therefore pushed up the US ratio. It is doubtful that the NVA were able to match that capability. Furthermore, many of the NVA so badly wounded that they could not make it back down the side of the hill were no doubt killed by subsequent fires. So an enemy wounded-to-killed ratio ranging between 1.5/1 and 2/1 would seem indicated -- 200 to 270 enemy WIA.

As noted in the narrative, airstrikes were delivered against what was thought to be the NVA assembly area in the valley to the northwest of the firebase. An indication of the effectiveness of the strikes came two days later when a powerful stench began to rise out of the valley. The dense foliage, continuing contact and the tactical necessity of first neutralizing Hill 1198 have so far prevented a sweep of the area, as of 8 April 1968. The fact that the NVA have also not yet been capable of burying their own dead is itself a reliable indicator of how severely the enemy was damaged, since in the past this task has always been high on the enemy's list of

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
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priorities.

RELIABILITY OF WITNESSES:

Cpt Brown and Cpt Frey both, quite naturally, seemed anxious to make the performance of their own people look as good as possible, and throughout the interviews there seemed to be a tense undercurrent of animosity between the infantry and the artillery. Exceptions to this were found in SSG Bradley's frank admiration of the infantry's courage, and in Lt Osler's crediting Cpt Frey with having done an "outstanding" job in organizing his people for the counterattack. On the whole, however, both Brown and Frey showed themselves to be competent witnesses, discussing the battle dispassionately with little show of emotion, and displaying, of all the witnesses, the most comprehensive and organized grasp of detail. Cpt Brown was probably the more objective of the two, readily admitting his mistake in not calling a full alert after movement was reported, and criticizing his own LP's for having cried wolf so often in the past that their reports that night could not be evaluated for their credibility. "Anytime they hear movement," he commented, "they're going to feel that all the NVA including Ho Chi Minh is out there." Valid as this observation may be, it set the stage for Brown's most noticeable lapse from objectivity in his assertion that his failure to call a full alert did not significantly contribute to the number of casualties his company took. This is doubtful. Cpt Frey, on the other hand, was conspicuously loyal to his people and said nothing critical of them, despite the fact that many of them remained in their bunkers up to the time SSG Bradley went to round them up for the assault on Gun 5, almost two hours after the contact began.

Lt. Osler's frankness is attested to by his admission of error in getting separated from his radio, and his comments did not seem to be affected



by any emotional carryover.

Lt Kankel said little except to protest that he knew little about what went on.

Sweet, Christoph and McMullen had<sup>a</sup> tendency to exaggerate, especially Sweet, but there were no indications of conscious distortion on their part. Christoph seemed to be the most objective of the three.

Kirby was still under psychiatric care for shell-shock at the time of the interview, and he almost wept when he recalled the contact. His testimony, however, was limited and non-controversial.

The interviewer failed to give his customary spiel about the purposes of the interview when he talked to SSG Kenniston. Cpt Brown had described him as talkative and ebullient, so the interviewer was somewhat puzzled when it developed that Kenniston had to be prodded and when the account he gave turned out to be rosier than, and sometimes in conflict with, other testimony. The explanation came when Kenniston, after the interview, asked if what he said would be sent to his hometown newspapers. So Kenniston's reliability is suspect.

Except for his brief foray into the #5 gun parapet, Lt Forbes was mostly on the fringe of the battle; but his information concerning the artillery fires seems accurate and undistorted.

SSG Bradley still seemed to be under the influence of an emotional carryover at the time of the interview, and he became repetitious at times and unsure of what he had witnessed. But he was astute enough to discern a pattern in the enemy employment of the flamethrower and the B-40 rocket.

Sgt. Olds was visibly shaken during his statement, and his strong reaction to the contact seemed to have blotted out most of his recall. Part of his nervousness was apparently due to his apprehension at speaking into a tape recorder.

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Cpt Robillard was initially reluctant to be interviewed, for fear that his information might damage somebody's career. After he was assured that the report would be restricted to historical channels, he spoke freely and frankly in the opinion of the interviewer.

The remaining witnesses, Cpt Moody, Cpt Lanford Sgt Scanio and Specialist O'Daniel, were self-possessed and gave, in the opinion of the interviewer, accurate and reliable information.

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FOOTNOTES

As a courtesy and in the interest of obtaining an additional viewpoint, LTC Malone was given the opportunity to read the draft of this report. He concurred with the bulk of the report with the exceptions contained in footnotes 1,2,3, and 5.


1. LTC Malone denied, as implied bby the events preceding the battle and as stated, he had heard, by another unit, that his mission was to seize and secure Hill 1198, "or by God we would have been on top of it". His mission he said, was to establish a blocking postion and develop the area, not to take Hill 1198.

2. LTC Malone remarked that the reason Company C was unable to remain on the ground it briefly occupied on 24 March was the unavailability of a helicopter to effect resupply.

3. LTC Malone disagreed with the statement that the bunkers on the west end were in a poor state of preparedness and said that they all had overhead cover. The interviewer feels he said this to prevent an unfavorable reflection on the commander of Company A. In this connection, Cpt Brown in his review of the draft wanted it made clear that his company had occupied the east end of the perimeter on the first night.

4. Cpt Robillard, the Fire Support Coordinator, later shed additional light on the dispute between Frey and Brown. The initial mortar assault had cut the telephone land lines, and a B-40 rocket hit the battery's generator so the only communication between the battery and the battalion TOC was Cpt Frey's radio, which emitted only a very weak signal and could be monitored only by Cpt Robillard. In addition to the radio reports he was making, Cpt Frey or his RTO would come to Robillard's position just





outside the TOC every half hour or so and deliver an oral sitrep. Robillard in turn kept the battalion commander, LTC Malone, informed of the situation. After one of Frey's jaunts to the TOC, Col Malone received word from Cpt Brown that the battery commander had refused to fire the beehive. Aware that the #5 Gun had fallen, Col Malone told Robillard to inform Frey that he, the battalion commander, directed that the beehive be fired. Shortly afterwards Frey again appeared at Robillard's position, and Robillard relayed the Colonel's order and made it clear to Frey that Brown was the ground commander on the perimeter and there was to be no further disputing of his decisions. Frey left and began preparations to fire the beehive.

5. LTC Malone stated that his instructions to Cpt Moody were to direct the airstrikes and take a radio to the battery and reestablish commo, not to "straighten out the artillery fires" as the report states. He made this point because he felt the artillery fires were effective and were going in where he wanted them. Cpt Robillard concurs in this, pointing out that the first 30 rounds fired were of the classified ammunition, which because of its wide casualty-producing radius could not be brought in close to the perimeter. It was only after Cpt Brown requested the use of HE rounds, Robillard states, that an attempt was made to bring the fires in closer.

71 Cpt Lanford said that his company made four separate attempts to reach the perimeter. On the first try, he got his men up out of their holes, but they were pinned down before they even got outside their own perimeter. SPOOKY fired in their support for about 20 minutes, then they made their second try. This time one of the squad leaders was killed and Cpt Lanford had a difficult time keeping his men from running back to their

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holes. Once more he got his men up and once again they were pinned down. Most of the company was still inside the perimeter at this time. Then the mortars from the battalion firebase finally found the range on the enemy. After they pounded the enemy for a while, Lanford ordered his men forward again. They still were reluctant, but Lanford told them they would take fewer casualties if they could break out before daylight. They got up again and this time made it in. Lanford forgot to look at his watch during all this, but he thinks it was about 0400 hrs when he was first alerted to come to the relief of the firebase and about 0530 when he finally made it in.

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Fire Support 3-8th contact night of 25-26 May 1968

34 Fighter Sorties  
75,700 lbs/Bombs  
15,000 lbs/Napalm  
1,600 Rnds/20mm

Spooky  
40,000 Rnd 7.62  
191 Flares

Arty 914 Rnds Total  
321 Rnds 105mm  
549 Rnds 155mm  
24 Rnds 155mm selected (30 rds according to Cpt Robillard)  
30 Rnds 175mm  
19 Rnds 105mm Beehive (18 rds according to Cpt Frey)

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The U.S. position is even less favorable in the two northern corps. There the enemy continues to roam almost at will in large units, forcing the Americans to stay holed up in their bases most of the time. In the Central Highlands of the II Corps last week three battalions of North Vietnamese regulars managed to break through the perimeter wire of a U.S. artillery base and overran one howitzer position.

TIME MAGAZINE

APRIL 5, 1968

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Division Interrogation Team  
4th Military Intelligence Detachment  
4th Infantry Division  
APO 96262  
280800 Mar 68  
Interrogator: FARASH

INDIVIDUAL INTERROGATION REPORT #4-350-68 (MACARTHUR)  
MAP REFERENCE: Vietnam 1:100,000 Sheet 6537

PART I: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

NAME: PHAN VAN BINH ALIAS: None  
RANK/POSITION: PFC/Rifleman  
UNIT: 3rd Sqd, 1st Flt, 2nd Co (subordination unknown)  
DOB: 1938  
POB: KY SON Village, NONG CONG District, THANH HOA Province, NVN  
CAPTURE DATA: Captured by E/3/8th Inf, 4th Inf Div, at (YA 939913)  
During an attack on a fire base on 260700 Mar 68.

PART II: INFORMATION OBTAINED

ORGANIZATION

- 2nd Co
  - 1st Inf Flt
    - 1st Sqd
    - 2nd Sqd
    - 3rd Sqd
  - 2nd Inf Flt
    - 4th Sqd
    - 5th Sqd
    - 6th Sqd
  - 3rd Inf Flt
    - 7th Sqd
    - 8th Sqd
    - 9th Sqd
  - Hvy Wpns Flt
    - 10th Wpns Sqd
    - 11th Wpns Sqd

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO  
YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFY ON: 31 Dec 74


Source has no knowledge concerning the present subordination of the 2nd Co. Prior to infiltration to SVN, the 2nd Co was subordinate to the 6th Bn, 304th NVA Rgt, Military Region 3. Source has no knowledge concerning the future subordination of the 2nd Co.

STRENGTH

The 2nd Co had a total strength of approx 102 men. The 3rd Sqd had nine men, including a SR SGT sqd ldr and CPL asst sqd ldr. The 1st Flt, 2nd Co, had a strength of approx 29 men, including one ASF plt ldr. The 10th and 11th Wpns Sqds each had approx eight men.

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INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEW REPORT #4-350-68 (MACAR: HUR)

PART II: INFORMATION OBTAINED (Continued)WEAPONS/EQUIPMENT

The 2nd Co had the following weapons: the 3rd Sqd, 1st Plt, had 7 x SKS carbines, each with 90 rounds, and 2 x AK-47 assault rifles, each with 100 rounds. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Plts, 2nd Co, had 1 x RPD LMG per platoon. The 10th Wpns Sqd had the following: 1 x RPG-2 AT grenade launcher with three rounds per weapon; 2 x RPD LMG; and 1 x SGM HMG. The 11th Wpns Sqd had the following: 1 x RPG-2 AT launcher with three rounds per weapon; and 3 x RPD LMG. In addition, each man in the 2nd Co was armed with two stick type fragmentation grenades. Source has no knowledge of chemical grenades or munitions, flame throwers or other weapons. The 2nd Co has no signal equipment or engineer equipment.

PERSONALITIES

The 2nd Co was led by JR LT CAN, the former XO of the 1st Co, 6th Bn, 304th NVA Rgt, in NVN. Source stated that JR LT KIM, the former CO, accompanied the 2nd Co during infiltration and later returned to NVN after arrival of the 2nd Co in SVN. Source stated that the remainder of the 2nd Co cadre officers remained in NVN and did not accompany the 2nd Co during infiltration. Source stated that he did not know the names of the CO, PO and APO. Source stated that he was confused by all the changes in the 2nd Co which occurred at the time of infiltration and that he does not know the names of any other personalities. The 1st Plt, 2nd Co, platoon leader was ASP BON.

MISSION

Source claimed that the 2nd Co and one unidentified company attacked a US landing zone on 26 Mar 68. Source claimed that the attack was not the primary mission of the 2nd Co. The 2nd Co had the mission of joining an unknown larger unit and to prepare for a future attack on an unknown installation. Source claimed to have no knowledge concerning the participation of other NVA units in the attack at the time of his capture. No other information could be obtained from Source concerning the mission of the 2nd Co.

DISPOSITION

Source stated that the 2nd Co had a base camp located approx 7km or 7hrs walking distance NW of the point of capture. Source could not be map tracked and stated that he travelled at night. The base camp was located in a valley with a dry stream-bed. A small trail crossed the stream in the vicinity of the base camp. There were no villages in the area. An unknown number of foxholes were dug at the base camp for protection from aircraft fire. No further information could be obtained from Source concerning the base camp location.

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INDIVIDUAL INTERROGATION REPORT #4-350-68 (MACARTHUR)

PART II: INFORMATION OBTAINED (Continued)SUPPLIES

Source stated that food and ammunition supplies were adequate. On 25 Mar 68, Source was issued five days supply of rice (approx 3kg) and 200gr of dried shrimp. At the time of his capture, Source had one days ration of cooked rice in his possession. All rations and equipment not required for the attack, was left at the base camp.

MORALE

Source claimed that the morale of the men of the 2nd Co was about average. Source was unable to provide any further information and claimed that he had no understanding of morale.

TRAINING/INFILTRATION

Source was inducted in the NVA on 4 Apr 67 in HA TAY province, NVN. From Apr 67 till May 67, Source had regular infantry basic training in HA TAY Province, NVN. From Jun 67 till Dec 67, Source continued basic training in HOA BINH Province, NVN, with the 1st Co, 6th Bn, 304th NVA Rgt. The 1st Co was alerted for infiltration during early Dec 67, at which time Source's platoon was transferred to the 2nd Co, 6th Bn, 304th NVA Rgt, and was designated as the 1st Plt. The 2nd Co infiltrated as a unit, with each platoon infiltrating one day apart. The 2nd Co went from HOA BINH to QUANG BINH Province, and entered Laos on approx 1 Feb 68. On approx 29 Feb 68, the 2nd Co entered SVN in KONTUM Province, at an unknown location. The 2nd Co continued travelling in a generally E direction. Approx three weeks ago, the 2nd Co underwent an airstrike by US F-86 fighter planes firing rockets. Location of the airstrike could not be determined. The airstrike resulted in one KIA and three WIA. After the airstrike, the 2nd Co continued travelling along small trails until arrival at the base camp located approx 7km NW of the point of capture.

MISCELLANEOUS

Source had a protective mask with goggles which he never utilized. Source has never been exposed to chemical agents and claimed to have no knowledge of NVA chemical capabilities. Source has never seen Soviet steel helmets in SVN and stated that all members of the 2nd Co wore OD colored ankle-high sneakers which were issued prior to infiltration. Source has heard of the 348th Bn in NVN but stated that he knows nothing more than that such a unit existed. Source claimed that he never heard of the NT-1 NVA Div. Source has heard of the B-3 Front and believed that the 2nd Co was in some way subordinate to the B-3 Front. Source would provide no additional information concerning NVA units, munitions, chemical capabilities, supply caches or personalities.

REMARKS

Source is a patient at the 71st Evac Hospital, PLEIKU, where he was interrogated. Source was interrogated by an interrogation team from

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INDIVIDUAL INTERROGATION REPORT #4- 350-68 (MACARTHUR)

REMARKS (Continued)

G-2, ARVN II Corps, prior to being interrogated by the 4th Inf Div interrogation team. Source refused to cooperate and contradicted himself continuously. Source appeared to be in a semiconscious state throughout the initial interrogation in spite of the fact that he suffered a slight wound in his right elbow. Source refused to cooperate with the ARVN interrogation team and was either unable or unwilling to talk to the interrogator who attempted to continue the interrogation. It is believed that Source was unwilling to provide information and made every effort to withhold significant information. Further interrogation of this Source is not recommended. Source was classified as a prisoner of war.

*James D. Seymour Jr*  
JAMES D. SEYMOUR JR.  
1LT, MI  
Interrogation Officer

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Division Interrogation Team  
4th Military Intelligence Detachment  
4th Infantry Division  
APO 96262  
281300 Mar 68  
Interrogator: BAUCUE

INDIVIDUAL INTERROGATION REPORT #4-351-68 (MACARTHUR)  
MPS: Vietnam 1:100,000 Sheet 6537

PART I: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Name: Nguyen van Thanh  
RANK/POSITION: Pfc/Rifleman  
UNIT: 7th Sqd, 6th Plt, 2nd Co, 7th Bn, 214th Regt  
DOB: 14 Sept 49  
FOB/HOB: Linh Duc (v), Thon Cau (h), Ung Hoa (D), Ha Tay (P), NVN  
CAPTURE DATE: Subject was captured during an NVA assault against a 3/8  
Fire Support Base on 26 Mar 68 in vic YA 939 913.

PART II: INFORMATION OBTAINED

ORGANIZATION

214th Regt

7th Bn

1st Co

3 Plts with 3 Sqds in each Plt

2nd Co

4th Plt

1st, 2nd and 3rd Sqds

5th Plt

4th, 5th and 6th Sqds

6th Plt

7th, 8th and 9th Sqds

3rd Co

3 Plts with 3 Sqds each Plt

8th Bn

Subject states that Organ is similar to the 7th Bn

9th Bn

Subject states that Organ is similar to the 7th Bn

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INFORMATION OBTAINED REPORT #4-351-68 (MACARTHUR)

STRENGTH

LEAD

7th Sqd 10 men  
 6th Plt 30 - 32 men  
 2nd Co 100 - 110 men  
 7th Bn 300 - 350 men  
 Subject does not know the strength of the other Bns or of the 214th Regt

WEAPONS

7th Sqd 3 x AK-47  
 6 x CKC  
 1 x RPD  
 6th Plt No additional wpns  
 2nd Co 2 x B-40 in addition to the light weapons in the rest of the Company.  
 7th Bn Subject does not know of any other weapons in the Bn. He states that he has not seen any Hvy MG, Mortars, Flame Throwers, Anti-Aircraft Guns, Trucks or Tanks.

AMMUNITION

Each CKC 20 rounds  
 Each AK-47 unk  
 Each RPD unk  
 Each B-40 6 or 7 rounds

DETAILS

Subject states that his unit has picked up supplies at small stations each being about 10 days walk apart, throughout their infiltration through Laos. Subject states that the last time his unit picked up food supplies was about 30 days ago and that they picked up an unusually large amount of supplies. Subject believes that this last pick up point was in Laos but he states that he cannot be sure. Subject further states that his unit has not been resupplied with any type of ammunition since leaving NVN. Subject knows of no supply points, warehouses or ammo/food caches in SVN, Laos or Cambodia.

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INFORMATION OBTAINED REPORT #4-351-68 (LUCENTHUR)

## DISPOSITION

Subject states that his unit has not visited any camps in SVN, Cambodia or Laos and has no contact with any other unit. Subject states that he had heard that his unit was supposed to reinforce another in SVN but he did not hear what Bn or where this Bn was supposed to be.

## TRAINING/INFILTRATION

Subject stated that he was drafted into the Army in April 1967 and he was assigned to his present unit, 2nd Co, 7th Bn, 214th Regt, which was stationed near Hanoi. Subject stated that he received 6 months of Basic Infantry Training with this unit and his training consisted of instruction in the following areas:-

- (1) Use of the GKC Rifle and AK-47 Rifle
- (2) Training Fire with these two rifles
- (3) Military Organization
- (4) Political Training
- (5) Field Operations with stress put on physical condition and the ability to carry heavy loads over long distances.

Subject stated that his unit completed their Basic Training in late October 67 and soon thereafter they began Infiltration into SVN.

Subject stated that only the 7th Bn of the 214th Regt infiltrated and that the 8th and 9th Bns remained in NVN. Further disposition of the 8th and 9th Bns was unknown.

Subject stated that the 7th Bn followed the normal infiltration route, going down through the southern provinces of NVN, crossing over Truong Son mountain into Laos and finally arriving in what he thought to be Kontum province. Subject stated that throughout the infiltration his unit crossed no rivers, only small streams not more than 5 or 6 meters wide. Subject further stated that the 7th Bn did not cross any highways after they left NVN but rather they traveled on small footpaths and through rugged, dense terrain. Subject saw no trucks nor tanks during infiltration. Subject stated that his unit was not hit with airstrikes during infiltration.

Subject stated that his unit (7th Bn) came into SVN about 15 days ago but he states that he cannot be sure because no one told them that they were in SVN.

Subject stated that his unit was traveling on a fairly new trail when they were fired upon by US forces in an outpost. Subject described this trail as being wide enough for 2 or 3 men to pass abreast and composed of dirt, generally running through dense jungle areas.

Subject stated that his Bn, after being fired on opened up on the American Outpost and mounted a general attack. Subject was wounded and subsequently captured during this attack.

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INFORMATION OBTAINED RE: REPORT 4-351-68 (MACARTHUR)

**PERSONALITIES**

**7th Bn**

- CO Vu van Co, Cpt
- XO None, Subject said that the XO remained in NVN.
- PO Nguyen van Son, Cpt
- APO None, also remained in NVN

**2nd Co**

- CO Bui si an, 1st Lt
- XO None, remained in NVN
- PO None, remained in NVN
- APO Ngo Xuan Vu, 2nd Lt

**6th Plt**

- Ldr Bui van Xa, Aspirant
- Asst Name unk, Subject said that he was a NVN Montagnard.

**7th Sqd**

- Ke, Sgt, Sqd Ldr
- Manh, Cpl, Asst Sqd Ldr

**REI/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION**

1. Subject stated that there were approximately 15 - 20 N. Vietnamese Montagnards in his Company (2nd Co. has appx. 100 - 110 men).
2. Subject stated that all men in the 7th Bn have steel helmets.
3. Subject stated that all the men in the 7th Bn were issued Gas Masks (Chinese type, 2 piece, with the filter element under the chin) just before they began infiltration. Subject stated that they received no training in the use of the gas mask other than a brief orientation on how it was to be used. Subject knows of no other offensive/defensive CBR equipment or weapons.
4. Subject states that some of the men in his Bn do wear leather boots as opposed to the rubber sandals that most of the men wear. Subject stated that the distribution of these leather boots was not limited to the cadre.
5. Subject states that he has never heard anything about CAYSUNG CROSSROADS.
6. Subject stated that his unit has not been hit by airstrikes in NVN, Laos, Cambodia or SVN with the exception of the contact in which the Subject was captured.
7. Subject knows of no NVA/VC base areas or supply areas in SVN, Laos or Cambodia.

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INFORMATION OBTAINED REFPOR #4-351-68 (MCGARTHUR)

EEL/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (CONT)

8. Subject states that he has seen no flame throwers, Hvy MG or Mortars in his Bn.

9. Subject states that he has seen no other units or personnel other than persons in the 7th Bn since leaving NVN.

10. Subject is not familiar with the 348th Bn, Mong Truong 1, The Front, 24th Regt, 66th Regt, 174th Regt, 223rd Regt, or the 40th Arty

11. Subject knows of no other units in SVN, Laos or Cambodia.

12. Subject knows of no other plans of his Bn. Subject stated that he had heard that the 7th Bn, 214th Regt was to reinforce another unit in SVN but he does not know where or what unit.

13. Subject states that he has seen no tanks or trucks in SVN Laos or Cambodia.

14. Subject states that he has never seen any Foreign Nationals serving in any capacity with the NVN Army.

REMARKS

This subject has not been overly cooperative although his injuries, which are only minor, could be thought to limit his response. He has been thoroughly consistent in all his answers. In spite of all his simple consistency I feel he is not telling me every thing that he knows and apparently he has no intention of telling anyone everything that he knows. As far as the information given in this report and its consistency with the battlefield report I think it is fairly obvious that the subject is blind (He has two good eyes) or he is definitely committing an act of utter prevarication. Subject was classified a prisoner of war.

*Richard A. Seiber 1LT AM*  
JAMES D. SEYBOUR JR.  
1st Lt, M I  
Chief, Intg Section

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Division Interrogation Team  
4th Military Intelligence Detachment  
4th Infantry Division  
APO 96262  
040830 Apr 68  
Interrogator: BAUCUM

INDIVIDUAL INTERROGATION REPORT #4- 352-68 (MACARTHUR)  
MAP: Vietnam 1:100,000 Sheet 6537

PART I: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

NAME: Banh van Y  
RANK/POSITION: Pfc/Rifleman  
UNIT: 2nd Sqd, 4th Plt, 2nd Co, 7th Bn, 209th Regt, 320th Div, MR-3  
DOB: 1951  
POB: Thuong Thanh (H), Gia Lam (D), Hanoi (P), NVN  
CAPTURE DATA: Subject captured during an NVA assault against a 3/8  
Fire Support Base on 26 Mar 68 in vic YL 939 913.

PART II: INFORMATION OBTAINED

ORGANIZATION  
320th Div  
141st Regt  
3 Bns  
4 Cos each Bn  
3 Plts each Co with 3 Sqds each Plt  
165th Regt  
3 Bns  
4 Cos each Bn  
3 Plts each Co with 3 Sqds each Plt  
209th Regt  
7th Bn  
1st Co  
3 Plts with 3 Sqds each Plt  
2nd Co  
3 Plts with 3 Sqds each Plt  
3rd Co  
3 Plts with 3 Sqds each Plt  
4th Co  
3 Plts with 3 Sqds each Plt  
8th Bn  
Organization similar to the 7th Bn  
9th Bn  
Organization similar to the 7th Bn

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INFORMATION OBTAINED REPORT #4-352-68 (MACARTHUR)

ORGANIZATION (CONT)

The following are units subordinate to the 209th Regt:-

- 16th Signal Co (Equipped with telephones and Wire Equip)
- 17th Signal Co (Equipped with 2 watt radios)
- 18th Engineer Co
- 19th Transportation Co
- 20th Medical Co
- 22nd Recon Co

STRENGTH

MEN

- Each Sqd 3 rifle 9 men
- Each Plt 30 men
- Each Co 100 men
- Each Bn 500 men

The exact manned strength of the 209th Regt was unknown.  
The manned strength for the 320th Div was unknown.

WEAPONS

- Each Sqd 2 x AK-47s, 6 x CKCs, 1 x RPD
- Each Plt 2 x B-40s in addition to above wps
- Each Co 2 x 60mm Mortars and 1 x Hvy MG in addition to the above wps.

Additional wps for the Bn, Regt and Div were unknown.

AMMUNITION

- Basic Loads
- CKC Rifle 50 rounds per wpn
- AK-47 100 rounds per wpn
- RPD 200 rounds per wpn
- Hvy MG 500 rounds per wpn
- 60mm Mortar 10 rounds per wpn

ENLISTMENT/TRAINING OBJECTIVE

Subject stated that he was drafted into the Army and he joined his unit (Present Unit) on the 27th Mar 67. Subject stated that he spent one month in Gia Lam district, Hanoi province with the 209th Regt receiving basic instruction on military customs and procedures. Subject stated that he was also "processed in" during this period.

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INFORMATION OBTAINED REPORT #4-352-68 (MACARTHUR)

ENLISTMENT/TRAINING (CONT)

Subject stated that in May 67 the 209th Regt moved to Than Cong hamlet, Phu Yen district, Thai Nguyen province, NVN for Basic Infantry Training.

Subject stated that this basic training consisted of care and use of the CKC rifle, use of the hand grenade, military organization, military tactics (Sqd formations, Plt formations, etc), military operations and political training.

Subject stated that in early November 67 the entire 209th Regt moved to Hoa Binh province, NVN on a training operation. Here they studied the principles of constructing trenches, constructing bunkers, setting up ambushes, attacking landing zones and static military positions.

INFILTRATION/ACTIVITIES IN SVN

Subject stated that on the 5th day of February 68 the entire 209th Regt began infiltration from Hoa Binh province NVN. The entire Regt was loaded onto about 40 military trucks (Each truck carried from 30 to 35 men) and they crossed through the following areas by truck during their infiltration;-

- a. Hoa Binh Prov., NVN
- b. Ninh Binh prov., NVN
- c. Thanh Hoa prov., NVN
- d. Nghe an prov., NVN
- e. Ha Tinh prov., NVN
- f. Quang Binh prov., NVN
- g. Laos

Subject stated that this trip took from 13 to 15 days. The convoy moved from 1900 to 0400 each night. Subject stated that the normal speed for the convoy was 25 to 30 km per hour. Subject stated that the convoy moved over roads that were extensively damaged from previous bombings. Subject stated that the convoy was hit by airstrikes 4 times during infiltration and one or two trucks were completely destroyed and several trucks were damaged and unable to go on until they were repaired.

Subject stated that after reaching what he believed to be southern Laos the 209th Regt left the trucks and marched for 3 days coming to a location by a small stream where they dug positions and rested. Subject stated that many men were suffering from malaria at this time. Subject stated that during infiltration his Regt had been known as the Quang Nam Group. Subject stated that after resting for 7 to 10 days the 209th Regt received orders to go and pick up supplies. The Regt traveled for 3 days in a westerly direction coming to a place known as TUC DONG.

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INFORMATION OBTAINED REPORT #4-352-68 (MACARTHUR)

INFILTRATION/ACTIVITIES IN SVN (CONT)

Subject stated that each man was given 25 kg of supplies (Food supplies only, ammo, basic loads being brought individually from NVN).

Subject described the TUC DONG area as a place in the dense jungle consisting of small warehouses with one or two cadre houses. Subject did not know how many troops were stationed at this installation.

Subject stated that after leaving the TOC DONG area the 209th Regt traveled in an easterly direction for a period estimated at 5 to 10 days. Subject stated that the Regt moved on a newly constructed road that was apparently constructed for vehicular traffic. Subject stated that he did not see any vehicles on this road.

Subject stated that on the 25th of March 68 the 7th Bn of the 209th Regt received orders to move off this road and attack a US landing zone nearby. Subject stated that the 7th Bn launched this attack on the 26th of March and that he was wounded during the assault and subsequently captured.

MISSION: Subject stated that the mission was to attack a US landing zone near the border of NVN and Laos.

Subject stated that when the 209th Regt left NVN the men were told that they were going on a very special mission but they were not told what the mission was to be.

DISPOSITION: Subject stated that the 209th Regt was broken up into small units and dispersed in the area of the attack.

Subject was very un knowledgeable about direction of travel and location of certain areas. Therefore it proved impossible to map track and locate positions.

PERSONALITIES

209th Regt: CO, Toan

PO Vinh

7th Bn: CO, Am, Cpt

KO Phuong, 1st Lt

PO Ri, Cpt

APO Bac, 1st Lt

2nd Co: CO, Thai, 1st Lt

PO Chinh, 2nd Lt

REMARKS

Subject was severely wounded in the head, requiring brain surgery and limiting the quality and quantity of his responses.

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INFORMATION OBTAINED REPORT #4-352-68 (MACARTHUR)

REMARKS (CONT)

Questioning this subject was very difficult. His mind seemed to wander, his responses were often nonsensical, he continually begged for his release (The Medical personnel found it necessary to tie him to his bed, both arms and legs to prevent him from inflicting self harm) and he occasionally would burst forth with loud, off key songs.

He continually contradicted himself. At times he would refuse to respond to questions at all. The only way we found to maintain his interest and responses was to feed him candy between responses.

Because of these difficulties I cannot state that I think this information to be true or untrue. Certainly indications from other sources would seem to indicate a strong possibility that this subject has given us a basically true story. Subject was classified a PW.

*[Signature]*  
JAMES D. SLYMOON JR.  
1st Lt, M I  
Chief, Intg Section

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Division Interrogation Team  
4th Military Intelligence Detachment  
4th Infantry Division  
APO 96262  
281700 Mar 68  
Interrogator: BAUCUR

INDIVIDUAL INTERROGATION REPORT #4-353-68 (McARTHUR)  
MAP: Vietnam 1:100,000 Sheet 6537

PART I: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

NAME: Vu The Hai  
RANK/POSITION: Pvt/Rifleman  
UNIT: ~~12th Sqd, 7th Flt, 10th Co, 9th Bn, 20th Regt, 308th Div~~  
DATE: 25 Aug 48  
PLACE: Nam Ha (v), Nam Tinh (h), Nam Chuc (D), Nam Ha (P)  
CIRCUMSTANCES: Subject captured during an NVA assault against a 3/8  
Fire Support Base on 26 Mar 68 in vic YA 939 913.

PART II: INFORMATION OBTAINED

ORGANIZATION

308th Div (Number of Regts in Div was unk)

20th Regt

7th Bn

4 Companies, 3 Flts in each Co, 3 Sqds in each Flt

8th Bn

4 Companies, 3 Flts in each Co, 3 Sqds in each Flt

9th Bn

8th Co

3 Flts in Co with 3 Sqds in each Flt

9th Co

3 Flts in Co with 3 Sqds in each Flt

10th Co

7th Flt

11th, 12th and 13th Sqds

8th Flt

3 Sqds

9th Flt

3 Sqds

12th Co

3 Flts in Co with 3 Sqds in each Flt

Subject knows of no other subordinate units to the 9th Bn or  
the 20th Regt.

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INFORMATION OBTAINED REPORT #A-353-68 (LACAMHUR)

STRENGTH

MEN

13th Sqd	6 men
7th Plt	25 men
10th Co	100 men
9th Bn	unk

WEAPONS

13th Sqd	1 x RFD 1 x AK-47 4 x GEC
7th Plt	No additional weapons other than those of type mentioned above.
10th Co	2 x 60mm Mortars 2 x B-40 RL

Weapons strength for the 9th Bn, 20th Regt or the 308th Div was not known by this subject.

PERSONALITIES

10th Co

CO Toan, 1st Lt  
 XO Chuyen, Aspirant  
 PO Hai, 1st Lt

The 3 above men stayed in NVN while cadre from the south came to NVN to lead the Company down. Subject did not remember the names of any of these cadre from SVN.

7th Plt Ldr Hoc, Aspirant  
 13th Sqd Ldr Tom, Sgt

SUPPLIES

Subject stated that after leaving NVN the 10th Co picked up rice and other food supplies at stations along the trail. Subject stated that these stations were about 15 days walk apart and that most of the stations consisted of one or two small huts with food supplies inside and maybe one small house with one, two or three NVA soldiers in residence. Subject further stated that about 10 days before they attacked the US outpost the 10th Co. picked up rice at a station described as having only one house and one SVN male there in residence.

Subject stated that the 10th Co had not been resupplied with ammunition since leaving NVN. Subject also stated that he knew of no rear areas, supply bases or food/ammo caches in Cambodia, Laos or SVN.

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## INFORMATION OBTAINED REPORT #4-353-68 (IMCANTHUR)

## TRAINING/INFILTRATION

Subject stated that he entered the Army in November 67 and joined the 10th Co, 9th Bn, 20th Regt, 308th Div.

Subject stated that he received Basic Infantry Training with the 10th Company in Hoa Binh province, NVN. The training consisted of use of the CKC rifle, use of the hand grenade, Military Organization and Discipline, Political Training and Field Operations. Subject stated that this training lasted for 2 months.

Subject stated that the 10th Co began infiltration soon after (Estimated to be the 3rd day of Feb 68). Subject stated that only the 10th Co infiltrated at this time.

Subject stated that his Company followed the normal infiltration route through the southern provinces of NVN, over Truong Son mountain into Laos and finally entering SVN in Kontum province. Subject stated that the entire infiltration was made on foot with the unit traveling over small dirt paths in an isolated portion of Laos. Subject stated that the 10th Co crossed the Song Nam river after about 1 month of infiltration. The 10th Co crossed the river in small boats. Subject stated that after leaving NVN the 10th Co picked up rice and food supplies at stations along the trails, each station being about 15 days walk apart.

Subject stated that about 10 days before his unit contacted US Forces, the 10th Co picked up rice at a station described as having only 1 house and one man there in residence. Subject stated that the 10th Co was joined at this station by a SVN male dressed in black clothing and carrying a CKC rifle. Subject stated that this man served as a guide.

Subject stated that after leaving this station the 10th Co traveled through a very dense area and after about 10 days march they came to a trail that appeared to be of new construction. They followed this trail for another 5 days and then they were hit with small arms fire from an American enclosure and they in turn attacked this enclosure. The subject described this enclosure as a landing zone but battlefield reports do not bear this out. Subject was subsequently wounded and captured in this attack and taken to the 71st Evacuation Hospital for treatment.

## REI/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Subject states that he has not seen or heard about any Foreign Nationals with the NVA (I.E. Russians, Chinese or N. Koreans).

2. Subject states that during infiltration and the time he has been in SVN he has seen no trucks or tanks manned by the NVA, in fact he has seen no trucks or tanks at all.

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INFORMATION OBTAINED REPORT #A-353-68 (MACARTHUR)

EEI/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

3. Subject stated that all the men in the 10th Co wear steel helmets.

4. Subject stated that all the men in the 10th Co were issued gas masks (Chinese type, 2 piece, with the filter element under the chin) just before they began infiltration. Subject stated that they received no training in the use of the gas mask other than a brief orientation on how it was to be used. Subject knows of no other offensive/defensive EBR equipment or weapons.

5. Subject states that he has never heard anything about ~~ANYTHING~~ CROSSROADS.

6. Subject states that his unit has not been hit with airstrikes in NVN, Laos, Cambodia or SVN with the exception of the contact in which the Subject was captured.

7. Subject knows of no NVA/VC base areas or supply areas in SVN, Laos or Cambodia.

8. Subject states that he has seen no flame throwers, Hvy MG or mortars in his Co.

9. Subject states that he has seen no other units or personnel other than persons in the 10th Co since leaving NVN.

10. Subject is not familiar with the 348th Bn, Nong Truong 1, The B-3 Front, 24th Regt, 66th Regt, 174th Regt, 223rd Regt or the 15th Arty Regt.

REMARKS

Subject has been very uncooperative, only giving answers after repeated questioning. Subject has not been consistent. Furthermore, the story given by this subject does not have any support in the battlefield report. There is no doubt in my mind that this subject is lying and most probably continue to lie. This man was classified a POW.

*Michael C. Seibler 127 1011*  
 JAMES D. SEYBOUR JR.  
 1st Lt, F.I.  
 Chief, Intg Section

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Division Interrogation Team  
4th Military Intelligence Detachment  
4th Infantry Division  
APO 96262  
240900 Apr 68  
Interrogator: [Name]

INDIVIDUAL INTERROGATION REPORT #4-357-68 (MACARTHUR)  
MAPS: POLET JAR STENG 1:50,000 Sheet 6537 IV  
DAK MOT LOP 1:50,000 Sheet 6538 III  
DAK TO 1:50,000 Sheet 6538 II

PART I: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

NAME: NGUYEN SY BO  
RANK/POSITION: M/SGT/AST PLT LDR  
UNIT: 2nd Plt., 12th Evy Wpns Co., K-6 Bn., 320th Regt., NONG TRUONG 1 Div.  
DOB: 8 Aug 1948  
POB: DA hamlet, THAI DAO village, LANG GIANG district, NA BAC province NVN  
RALLY DATA: Rallied to the 2/35 Inf fire base on 20 Apr 68 at V4939945

PART II: INFORMATION OBTAINED

- ORGANIZATION
- 1st Div
- 320th Regt (aka 209th Regt)
- K-6 Bn
- 1st Inf Co
- 2nd Inf Co
- 3rd Inf Co
- 4th Wpns Co (DKZ and 60mm mortar)
- 5th Wpns Co (82mm mortar)
- K-5 Bn
- 6th Inf Co
- 7th Inf Co
- 8th Inf Co
- 9th Wpns Co (DKZ and 60mm mortar)
- 10th Wpns Co (82mm mortar)
- K-6 Bn
- 11th Inf Co
- 12th Inf Co
- 13th Wpns Co (DKZ and 60mm mortar)
- 14th 12.7 AA Co
- 15th Wpns Co (82mm mortar)
- K-7 Bn

Subject stated that the K-7 Bn is part of the 60th Regt, but is OPCOM for the 320th Regt at this time. Subject believes that the K-7 Bn is organized much like the Bn in the 320th Regt. In each company there are 3 platoons with 3 squads in each platoon.

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ORGANIZATION (cont)

- Support Units
- 18th Signal Co.
- 19th Engineer Co.
- 20th Medical Co.
- 23rd Transportation Co.
- 24th HQ Co.
- 25th Rear Services Co.

STRENGTH

Subject stated that each company has about 100 men with 30 men in each platoon and 15 men in each squad. There are 10 men in a HQ section which are composed of cadre.

Subject stated that K-4 Bn was under strength at the present time with only about 350 men while the K-5 and K-6 Bns have about 500 men each. Subject stated that the K-4 Bn was due for replacements soon, but from where or how many was not known to the subject.

PERSONNEL

NAME	RANK	POSITION	UNIT
TOAN	2	CO	320th Regiment
CANH	Sr Cpt	CO	K-6 Bn, 320th Regiment
PHAN KHAC MAU	1 Lt	CO	14th Co, K-6 Bn 320th Regt.
XONG	2 Lt	XO	14th Co, K-6 Bn 320th Regt.
VU TRONG THONG	1 Lt	PO	14th Co, K-6 Bn 320th Regt.
NGUYEN DUY BIEN	2 Lt	APD	14th Co, K-6 Bn 320th Regt.
SO	M/SGT	PLT LDR	1st Plt, 14th Co K-6 Bn
KHUAT DUY AN	ASF	PLT LDR	2nd Plt, 14th Co, K-6 Bn
SU	ASF	PLT LDR	3rd Plt, 14th Co, K-6 Bn

WEAPONS/EQUIPMENT

Subject stated that the 14th Company has 6 x 12.7mm AA Guns, 3 x 7.62 LMG, 13 x AK-47's, 18 x GKG's and 4 x 7.62mm Sub MG type 50. Subject stated that the rest of the company carries ammo and tends to the wounded when necessary. The 4th Co., 9th Co., and 13th Co. has B-40, B-41 and 75mm RE Rifle capabilities. Subject doesn't know the exact number of weapons that these units have, but is sure that they have them. Subject heard that some Bns have 122mm rocket capabilities but doesn't know which Bns have this capability or how many 122mm rockets are in use at this time.

Subject stated that type VTT radios were used on their trip to SVN. These radios were used all the way from the North to the South. Field telephones were also used during their infiltration to the South. Subject stated that about 100 trucks were used to infiltrate to the South. A complete explanation of this will be given in the infiltration section of this report.

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Mission

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Subject stated that the mission of his unit (14th AA Company) is to support any of the Bns while in contact. This support is in the form of anti aircraft capabilities. The unit was to watch for small craft and helicopters. The mission of the 320th Regt was to take over the fire base that the 3/8 was holding at the time. Subject stated that another objective of the Regiment was to attack CA LANG (probably POH KLE CO). The purpose of these attacks were to control this area so that Hwy 18 could be controlled by the NVA. The NVA wanted to control this area so that they could transport trucks, artillery and tanks through this area. Subject stated that the Regiment would attack again to achieve their goal. The time or strength of this attack is unk to the subject. Subject also stated that the 320th wanted to secure these areas for future plans in the South. Subject heard this information from his Co and doesn't know what area the Regt was interested in at this time.

DISPOSITION

Subject stated that during the attack on the fire base, the K-4 Bn was used as the main force while K-6 Bn was used as reinforcement and the K-5 and K-7 Bns were used in reserve. Subject stated that the 14th Company was about 1 kilometer from the U.S. line and was used to protect the other units from helicopters. Subject stated that his unit shot down one helicopter during the attack. Subject stated that after the U.S. forces reinforced their units, the NVA had to withdraw to the rear and broke contact. Subject stated that the Regt remained in the area of the battle until Apr 17, at this time the whole Regt moved SE one days walk for resupply and rest. Subject stated that they were resupplied from a Transportation Company (whole Regt) two or three days at this location and the subject decided to rally. Subject believes that the Regt will try another attack on the same area and try to achieve their original goal.

LOSSES/REPLACEMENTS

Subject stated that the K-4 Bn was used as the main force, and because of this they received heavy losses. One company of this Bn was completely destroyed except for 6 men. In the 14th AA Company there was 1 KIA and 1 MIA. Subject doesn't know of any replacements before or after the battle at the fire base.

OTHER UNIT FORCES

Subject knows that the 66th Regt is operating in SWV at the present time, but the location of this Regt is unk to the subject. Subject stated that the 121st Regt is at the same location and that the 165th Regt was to join them soon at the same location.

Subject stated that at present the K-7 Bn of the 66th Regt is OPCOM to the 320th Regt. Subject doesn't know how long this will be in effect but believes that it will remain this way until the 320th gets more men in their own units.

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TRAINING / INFILTRATION

Subject was drafted into the army on 6 Apr 66. He went to THAI Province, THO-YAM District for training. During this time he belonged to the 6th squad, 2nd platoon, 21st Company, 209th Regiment, 312th Division. He trained for 16 months. During this training, he was taught the use and operation of the 12.7 mm. Subject stated that his training was very difficult and didn't leave any room for errors. Subject stated that anywhere from 40 to 200 men were in a class depending on the number of men that were available to take the course.

Subject stated that the 141st and the 320th Regt infiltrated together, while the 165th Regt remained in the North. The 141st Regt departed in another direction on the way down to SVN. The subject doesn't know where the Regt went. Subject believes it to be in the South.

On 20 Jan 68 the 320th Regt began to infiltrate to the South. The Regt left from BAC THAI on foot to HOA BINH Province on 5 Feb. On 7 Feb at THONH HO Province the Regt picked up about 100 trucks for the rest of their infiltration. On 9 Feb they reached HA TINH. The Regt would always move during the night and rest during the day. On 10 Feb the Regt reached QUANG BINH Province just before entering LAOS. The Regt entered LAOS on Feb 12 and traveled in this country for 18 days. On 1 Mar the Regt reached KONTUM Province. Subject stated that it took one night's ride for them to reach KONTUM Province by truck. Subject stated that the trucks went into SVN about 30 kilometers before they had to get out and walk. Subject stated that during their infiltration they changed trucks at different points of their trip. Subject didn't know exactly where the changes were made, but remembers this because the trucks never had to stop for gas. Once they left one set of trucks, there was another waiting for them at a given location (unk to subject). Subject stated that the convoy had well trained guides to lead the way to the South. These guides were NCOs who knew a certain portion of the route, then once arriving at another station the guides would change and the others would return to the previous station to wait for another group of infiltrators. Subject stated that 3 NCOs are trained in just a certain portion of the route and then return to the station in which they came from. Subject believes that this specialization is the best way of infiltrating to the South.

Subject stated that Hwy 12-C was used in LAOS (from HOA to NINH BINH), other roads that were used were not known to the subject. In LAOS, the subject noticed a new road still under construction by the NVA, subject doesn't know the name or number of this road. Subject stated that at the end of each night of travel, the Regt would arrive at a Commo Liaison Station. The names or numbers of these stations are unk to the subject. While at these stations the subject's Regt receives rice and some meat. Subject stated that they never seem to have enough to eat at these stations. Subject stated that at each station, the Regt was received by officers who were in control of the station. While at the station, the officers there were in charge of the troops and what they did during their stay. This was the case at all the stations that the Regt stopped at.

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TRAINING/INFILTRATION (cont)

Subject stated that all the stations had commo between them, and if the convoy was in between stations a messenger would be used for commo. Subject stated that they never had any problem with commo during their infiltration to the South.

Subject stated that during their infiltration the Regt was bombed. The results were 100 KIA and WIA. No trucks were damaged during this attack. The Subject couldn't understand how the planes saw them from the sky because of the cover they had over them. Subject stated that after this point, they were never hit again.

Subject stated that while his unit was at T-3, he heard that there was a hospital with an American being treated there. Subject stated that he has never seen the American but heard from a messenger that he is at this location. The subject describes the American as being about 20 years old with brown hair and weighting about 150 pounds. Subject stated that the American has a head wound but is able to walk (according to the information he received). The subject believes that the American is still at this hospital and is progressing well. Subject stated that the hospital and all of T-3 is well guarded and would be hard to get into. According to the subject, there are always units coming through this point while infiltrating. There is no exact way that one can be sure what force is at this location at any one given time.

MORALE

Subject stated that before the attack the morale of his unit was very high. This was to be their first time in battle and they were anxious to see exactly what it was like. After the battle, most of the men maintained the same feelings of high spirits because they felt that they had killed many Americans and showed them that they had power also. Subject stated that the NVA are fearless and are ready to fight whenever necessary.


TACTICS ON A BATTLE

Subject stated that during an attack the following is done:

1. if a high hill is present, they always put their AA guns on the side of the hill (slope).
2. if the hills around the area are low, they will set up their AA guns on top of the hill.

The following is a diagram of how they would set up their weapons during a attack. (Each AA Gun fires a burst, with only one AA Gun at a time. There is never more than one AA Gun firing at one time.

3. The 14th Co. always sets up about 1 kilometer from the U.S. line



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MISCELLANEOUS

Subject's history:

1. personnel status - single
2. mother's name - DAO THI CHOT
3. father's name NGUYEN SI NHUONG (dead)
4. has 9 brothers and sisters (none of which are in the army)
5. Budist
6. three years schooling
7. farmer before entering into the army

Subject believes that the Communist Party is very strong and right in its doings. Subject feels that the North will fight until the last man is dead if necessary. Subject stated that North has a strong way of thinking and it will take more than talk to end this war.

Subject's reasons for rallying:

1. Artillery during his infiltration
2. Subject didn't like killing people and has nothing against American or ARVNs.
3. Subject was drafted into the army and didn't want to leave the North in the first place.

REMARKS

Subject was very cooperative and was willing to help in any way he could.

Subject would like to stay at the 4th Division and work in any way possible. Subject was classified a returnee.

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JAMES D. SEYMOUR Jr.  
 1 Lt MI  
 CHIEF, INTERROGATION SECTION

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Division Interrogation Team  
4th Military Intelligence Detachment  
4th Infantry Division  
APO 96262  
240900 April 1968  
Interrogator: Palasma

INDIVIDUAL INTERROGATION REPORT #4-358-68 (MACARTHUR)  
MAPS: POLEI JAR SIENG 1:50,000 Sheet 6537 IV  
POLEI BRENG 1:50,000 Sheet 6537 I

PART I: BACKGROUND INFORMATION (C)

NAME: HOANG VAN CAN

RANK/POSITION: Sgt/Sgt

Unit: 4th Sqd, 2nd Pl, 4th Co, 6th Bn, 320th Regt, 1st Div

DOB: 18 Oct 1927

POB: HOANG DU (V); BIRTH LOC (D); NAT: VN (P); NVN

CAPTURE DATA: Subject CHIEN HOANG to the 4th Inf Div at YN941915 on 20 April 1968.

PART II: INFORMATION OBTAINED (C)

ORGANIZATION: (C)

Subject states that the 320th Regt has approximately 1,000 men and is organized as follows:  
320th Regiment  
Headquarters Section  
1st Bn  
2nd Bn  
3rd Bn  
4th Bn  
5th Bn  
6th Bn  
7th Bn  
8th Bn  
9th Bn  
10th Bn

Headquarters Section  
1st Bn  
2nd Bn  
3rd Bn  
4th Bn  
5th Bn  
6th Bn  
7th Bn  
8th Bn  
9th Bn  
10th Bn

Headquarters Section  
1st Bn  
2nd Bn  
3rd Bn  
4th Bn  
5th Bn  
6th Bn  
7th Bn  
8th Bn  
9th Bn  
10th Bn

Headquarters Co  
1st Signal Co  
19th Engineer Co  
20th Medical Co  
22nd Recon Co

23rd Transportation Co  
25th Rear Services Co  
4th Bn  
1st Infantry Co  
2nd Infantry Co

- 3rd Bn
- 4th Weapons "
- 5th Weapons "
- 5th Bn
- 6th Infantry Co.
- 7th "
- 8th "
- 9th Weapons "
- 10th "

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ORGANIZATION: (Cont'd)

- 6th Bn
- 11th Infantry Co
- 12th " " "
- 13th " " "
- 14th Weapons Co
- 1st 12.7 AA Plt
- 2nd Mort Plt
- 3rd Mort Plt
- 15th Weapons Co.

Subject states that he thinks that the 4th, 9th and 14th Weapons Co's have the same structure because all weapons Co's were reorganized in order that each Bn could have its own weapons section and also in order that each Bn could operate independent from the Regiment. Subject thinks that the 4th, 9th and 14th Weapons Co's are the Co's which have the 12.7mm AAMG. Each of these three Co's would have 2-12.7 AAMG's.

STRENGTH: (C)

Subject stated that the 320th Regt has approximately 1800 men. Subject stated that the total strength of the Regimental support units is approximately 550 men. Subject stated that the 20th Medical Co has approximately 60 men which includes a doctor. The 23rd Transportation Co has approximately 150 men. Headquarters Co of the 320th Regt has approximately 100 men.

K4 Bn has approximately 350 men due to their high losses on the battle on the 26th of March 1968. Subject thinks that they will soon have replacements if they have not already received their replacements. K5 Bn has a strength of approximately 500 men. K6 Bn has approximately 500 men. Each Co has 100 men. In the 14th Co, K6 Bn the 1st plt has 30 men while the 2nd and 3rd plt's have a combined total of 70 men.

WEAPONS/EQUIPMENT: (C)

In the 1st plt, 14th Co, 5th Bn there are 6 AK-47's, 6 CKC's and 2 12.7mm AAMG's. The other two plt's in the 14th Co. are equipped with Light machine guns, B40's, B41's, 61mm Mort, and 82 mm Mort's. One weapons Co. in each Bn is equipped in the same manner. The other Weapons Co's are equipped with MG's, B-40's, B41's, 61mm Mort's, 82mm Mort's. Subject stated that if they need additional heavy weapons support they can draw support from the Heavy Weapons Bn which is directly subordinate to NFI. From the Heavy Weapons Bn they can receive support from 120mm Mort's and 122mm RL's. Each individual is issued the following equipment and supplies for a 15 day period:

- 400 rds 12.7 ammunition to each squad
- 300 rds AK-47 ammunition " "
- 200 rds for CKC's " "
- First-aid kit " "
- 2 Fragmentation grenades " "
- 1 protective mask with goggles " "
- shovel or a pick " "
- 10 kilograms of rice " "
- 1 kilogram of meat " "
- 500 grams of salt " "
- 200 grams of sugar " "

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WEAPONS/ EQUIPMENT (Cont'd) (C)

The 14th Co also has 1 radio with which they can contact the 6th Bn and the 320th Regt Headquarters. The 14th Co also has 5 sets of binoculars. The Infantry Co's are equipped with the following weapons: AK-47, CKC, BL 40, B-41, and 61mm Mortars. The 18th Signal Co is equipped with 5 radios (type unk), AK-47's, and CKC's. In the 22nd Recon Co all men carry an AK-47 and each cell (3 men) has a set of binoculars.

DISPOSITION: (C)

Subject stated that he arrived in SVN at the tri-border area of SVN, CAMBODIA, and LAOS. Subject said that he stayed in T-3 for about 20 days. The whole Regiment rested at this point. Subject does not know the exact location of this area. From there the 320th Regt moved 20 kilometers into KONTUM Province by vehicle. Subject thinks that the point at which they dismounted the trucks is approximately four days walk from the 3/8 firebase (M2). Subject was able to give the location of his unit for 190900 April 1968 as being YA903928. Subject knows that there are supply and ammunition caches in the T-3 area, but he can not give an exact location of them. Subject stated that the 1st Division Hospital is on the slope of a hill 20 kilometers due east of the tri-border. Subject was told this location by his company cadre.

MISSION: (C)

The mission of the 14th co, 6th Bn, 320th Regt is to provide support to the 6th Bn in defence from helicopters, during the offensive in (GIA) LAI Province. The mission of the 5th Bn, 320th Regt is to work in ORCON with the 66th Regt. Their mission will be to destroy M2 (3/8 (firebase at YA9494) and a special forces camp approximately 12 kilometers east of M2. Subject called this special forces camp UTAH. The reason for this offensive will be to cut off Hwy 18 and join an infiltration route to Hwy 19. By doing this the NVA feel that they will be able to use Hwy 18 in the Monsoon offensive to resupply their forward areas by vehicle. Subject stated that his political officer told him that the attack would take place before 1 May 68. Subject's political officer also told him that the Monsoon offensive would probably start when the peace talks between NVN and United States are either announced or when they begin. Subject stated that the reason given for this will be to put pressure on the United States so that we will be forced to comply with HO CHI MINH'S demands.

The mission of the 4th Bn, 320th Regt will be to wait in the T-3 area until replacements are allotted to them to compensate their losses on the battle of 26 March 1968.

REPLACEMENTS: (C)

Subject feels that it will be difficult to receive replacements to the forward areas, but that replacements would be very easy to get if the requesting unit was sent directly to T-3. Subject stated that this is due to the large amount of troops arriving in T-3.

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NOTE: (C)

(S) (P) (U) (V) (W) (X) (Y) (Z)

Subject stated that they have good morale because their unit was well supplied and they were not afraid. Although they lost the battle at firebase 14, their morale is still high because they think that the next attack on the same base will be a victory for them. Subject found CHIU HOI leaflets when he arrived in country and also heard and understood the CHIU HOI message given from loudspeakers on our helicopters. Subject stated that he had relatives living and working in SAIGON. Subject stated that he doesn't like to fight. He said that he didn't want to kill any ARVN soldiers because they are his own people.

(S) (P) (U) (V) (W) (X) (Y) (Z)

PERSONAL LIVES: (C)

TOAN	Major	CO	320th Regt
CAMH	Captain	CO	6th Bn
NEU	2 Lt	CO	14th Co
SUNG	Aspirant	XO	14th Co
THONG	1 Lt	PO	14th Co
BIEN	2 Lt	APO	14th Co
SO	MSGT	pld ldr	1st pld
DAM	MSGT	ass pld ldr	1st pld
AT	Aspirant	pld ldr	2nd pld
BO	MSGT	ass pld ldr	2nd pld
SU	Aspirant	pld ldr	3rd pld
HOA	MSGT	ass pld ldr	(b) 3rd pld

TRAINING AND INFILTRATION (C)

On 5 Jan 1966 subject was drafted into the Army at BONG DU (V), BINH LUC (D), NAM HA (P), NVL. Subject received his notification of draft by mail. Subject went to basic training at PHO YEN (D), THAI NGUYEN (P), BINH. Subject remained at this training area for two years. Subject stated that his instructors were an aspirant and a 1st pld; these instructors had been in the army for a long time but they had never fought in any wars before. The following is a breakdown of the time sequence of their training:

- 1 month Basic Infantry Training
- 10 months 12.7mm AMC Training
- 1 month Political Training
- 1 month Tactical Infantry Training
- 10 months 12.7mm AMC Training
- 1 month Political Training

Subject stated that they had a few days of first aid training in their 12th month. They were trained how to protect themselves from chemical agents at the same time. After the two years of training had been completed, the entire 209th Regt had a mock battle on their way to HOA BINH (P). In this battle one half of the Regt represented the ARVN soldiers while the other side represented the NVA soldiers. At HOA BINH (P) one half of the Regt boarded trucks while the other half waited for two days.

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TRAINING AND INFILTRATION (CONT'D) (c)

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Subject was able to identify the trucks they used as being KRAZ 214 (6 x 6) (which is an all wheel drive truck used for smooth surface roads) and GAZ 63 (4 x 4) (which is a four wheel drive truck used for rough surface roads). Subject stated that he went with his unit on the first convoy. Subject stated that they brought the 12.7mm AAMG with them from the north. While infiltrating they used their lights with hooded blinds because they traveled only at night. During the infiltration they traveled from one station to the next station in one night. At each station they boarded a different vehicle and the vehicle which they had arrived on returned to the previous station. They maintained communication with the 2nd portion of the regt through the use of runners and radios which were at each station. The stations maintained communication between themselves by radios. Subject stated that they passed through the following provinces: HOA BINH - THANH HOA - NGHE AN - HA TINH - QUANG BINH - LAOS. Subject stated that when he was in NVN he saw a V6 jet shot down by a Surface to Air missile which is a Chinese weapon and is called TEN-LUA. Subject states that there are many Chinese helping the NVA to defend themselves from the American planes in the north. Subject stated that they refueled in QUANG BINH when they were approximately 60 kilometers into the province. The fuel dumps are usually about 100 meters off the road. While in QUANG BINH he saw approximately one bn of infantry soldiers walking to the south. Approximately 60 kilometers into LAOS the road was too badly bombed to use the trucks on it. At this point they walked to next station by a foot path which took them seven days. While walking past this area he saw approximately 2 bns of infantry soldiers who said they were from Military District 3. Subject said that there were workers working on the bombed out stretch of the road with picks and shovels. Bunkers are built along the road so that if they are bombed they can have some protection. Subject stated that from the North to the Tri-border area they have approximately 50 57mm AA Arty emplacements with 4 guns and 30 men to each emplacement. These emplacements are placed approximately 20 - 30 kilometers apart. When the unit reached the Tri-border area he saw trucks which were evacuating wounded to the North. Subject said that he talked to them and they said that they were going back to NVN. Subject's cadre told him that the 1st Div hospital was located approximately 20 kilometers east of the Tri-border. While resting for twenty days in the Tri-border area, subject saw approximately 2 bns of infantry soldiers who were to remain in the B-3 Front, but who were not yet assigned to a unit. After they had rested for twenty days they moved down to Y19491 at which point they made contact with the US. It took them four days from the point at which they rested to arrive at the point at which they made contact on 26 Mar 68.

TACTICS: (c)

Subject stated that the 12.7 has the capabilities to shoot down an aircraft which is flying within a range of 1800 meters and is flying slower than 150 meters per second. Subject said that they can fire at helicopters, small craft planes, transports, and F-100 jets.

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TACTICS CONT'D (C)

The following is a table which gives the number of clicks on a v-  
ation to use for different ranges and aircraft speeds:

1200	1800	600	1200	0	600
60	80	2	3	2	2
80	120	2	4	2	2
120	150	6	2	2	4

Subject stated that in firing the 12.7mm AAMG on F-100 jets they must lead the plane 1200 - 1500 meters. In firing at a C-130 they must lead the plane 700 - 800 meters. In firing at small craft planes and helicopters they fire directly at the cockpit of the aircraft. Subject stated that it takes two men to fire the 12.7. He said that ordinarily they will not fire at helicopters at night because all of their nos are tracers and it would be too easy to give away their location. If the aircraft is flying extremely low at night they might fire on it depending on how many other aircraft are flying with it. In the daytime they will fire on helicopters as they come into range. They will fire on the first helicopter in a line and then fire on the others in order. Usually they try to fire only 3-4 rds at each helicopter. If they know that they have damaged an aircraft they will continue to fire on it until it is out of range. They can fire on an aircraft when it is within 15 to 70 elevation from their firing point. Subject stated that they will never fire on an L-19 or any other type of observation airplane. When they set up a fire base they will always choose an area which is either on the side of a hill or on the top of a hill. Subject stated that on flat ground their range is not as good as it is on a hill. Subject also says that on flat ground they can be more easily detected.

MISCELLANEOUS: (C)

Subject stated that NVA intelligence personnel are trained in NVN for periods of one, three, or five years. They range in rank from corporals to 1st's and range in age from 18 to 35. These are intelligence people attempt to become part of the situation about which they are to collect intelligence.

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MISC: CONT'D (C)

Intelligence personnel report to local Viet Cong units for instructions on local customs, habits, legal documentation, and the like.

Intelligence personnel draw maps, attempt to locate cannons, bunkers, mines, and wire around base camps and fire bases. They may watch the camp with binoculars or may even go into the camp. They have no radio. They observe the camp for two or three days and then report their information to the NVA bn Commander. If the camp has no ARVN soldiers the intelligence personnel attempt to recon at night. Sometimes they wear ARVN fatigues if there are ARVN in the base camp.

(C) Subject stated that his cousin infiltrated to the south and was with the DAC CONG who proceeded to look for and repair roads. His cousin deserted shortly after he arrived in the south and returned to NVN. His cousin lost his citizenship and right.

Subject stated that when he CHIU HOI'd he had his rank insignia in his wallet. When he was searched at the fire base they removed the rank insignia from his wallet and never returned it nor receipted the item for him.

Subject stated that in the contact on 26 March 1968, their unit (320 Regt) took one prisoner. Subject talked to the messenger who was in the interrogation. The messenger told him that the prisoner was described as caucasian, weight - 165 lbs, 1m 80cm tall, corporal, brown hair, head wound, from Washington, and had two younger sisters. Subject thinks that this man was evacuated to the Division hospital in T-3. Subject stated that the interpreter was probably trained in the north, but that he doesn't know the extent of the training. Subject thinks that the interpreter is assigned directly to NT1.

REMARKS: (C)

Subject was very co-operative throughout the interrogation and freely gave any information he knew. Subject said that he would like to work for the fourth division if it is possible. Subject was classified a returnee.


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1Lt, MI  
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3-8th Inf Contact, 26 March 68

NVA PW

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NARA, Coln



3-8th Inf Contact, 26 March 68

DEAD NVA IN US BUNKER



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3-8th Inf Contact, 26 March 68

DEAD NVA

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DEAD NVA



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BEEHIVE VICTIM


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1/13/00, 02/11/00



3/8th Inf Contact, 26 Mar 68

DEAD NVA

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LS



3/8th Inf Contact, 26 Mar 68

CAPTURED CHICOM CLAYMORE

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3/8th Inf Contact, 26 Mar 68

CAPTURED B-40 ROCKETS & MISC GEAR



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LS  
DATE 04/11/01



3/8th Inf Contact, 26 Mar 68

DEAD NVA


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3/8th Inf Contact, 26 Mar 68

DEAD NVA

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Authority 873541  
LS  
NARA, DASH




3/8th Inf Contact, 26 Mar 68

CAPTURED CHICOM GRENADES



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LS 1751A, 0211



3/8th Inf Contact, 26 Mar 68  
CAPTURED MACHINE GUN

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority 873541  
by LS  
Date 11/01/01



3/8th Inf Contact, 26 Mar 68  
NVA DEAD ON SLOPE, WEST END

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority 873541  
LS NARA, OIA



3/8th Inf Contact, 26 Mar 68  
NVA DEAD

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority 873541  
LS NAVA, OAH



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DEAD NVA



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LS 11/20/06, 02/13



3/8th Inf Contact, 26 Mar 68

DEAD NVQ

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BY LS (NVA, DIA)



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DEAD NVA

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3/8th Inf Contact, 26 Mar 68

GUN # 4



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3/8th Inf Contact, 26 Mar 68

AIRSTRIKE ON PEAK IN FRONT OF HILL 1198